



PRODUCED BY  THE 
EXPENDITURE OF GOVERKMENT 
DURING  TIIE 
RESTRICTION OF CASH PAYMENTS. 
BY  WILLIAM BLAKE THE  following observations were written 
in the beginning of last year, but I forbore 
to publish them, because inquiries relating 
to the currency had  ceased to excite much 
interest.  The discussions at the late county 
meetings have induced me  to think, that 
the publication  of  these observations now 
will not be wholly useless.  It is necessary, 
however, to mention, that where allusion is 
made to the present state of things, it must 
be understood to refer to the month of Fe- 
bruary, 1822. 
PORTLAND-PLACE. 
1Cfnrch 3,  1823. OBSERVATIONS, 
THERE  never,  perhaps,  was  a  period  which 
presented  to the political  economist  so  many 
interesting objects of inquiry as that wliich has 
occurred during the continuance, and since the 
terlnication of the late war.  Peace, instead of 
its accustomed  attendant  blessings,  seems  to 
have brought calamity and distress upon almost 
every class  of' society;  ancl  the circumstances 
in which we are placed appear to be so peculiar 
and anomalous, as scarcely to admit of  a satis- 
factory  solution.  We  have  seen  landed  pro- 
prietors without  rents ;  farmers and manufac- 
turers without a market ; tllc ~nonied  capitalist 
ready to  lend, and the merchant not wanting to 
borrow;  a redundant capital, yet a redundant 
population; and the indl~strious  poor compelled 
to apply, like mendicants,  at the parish work- 
house. 
To account for these nppcaranccs every one 
has his favourite theory, nacl I)clieves or assurlles 
the facts that will best support it.  One sect of' political economists asserts that there is n want 
of capital, another that there is an excess.  One 
party recommends us to save from our revenue, 
in order  to increase our  capital;  another,  to 
increase our expenditure by converting capital 
into revenue.  The agriculturist, although he 
has had for  some  years  the monopoly  of  the 
home  market,  still  petitions  for  protecting 
duties against foreign  corn ;  whilst  the manu- 
facturer  urges  the necessity  of keeping down 
its price, that he may not be undersold  in the 
foreign  markets.  Upon  one  point  alone  all 
parties  seem  to be agreed,  namely,  that  the 
value of  our currency has been  depreciated to 
the extent of 55  or 30 per cent,. ;  and that in 
whatever degree other causes may have operated 
to produce  the present  distress,  the  evil  has 
been aggravated by the too sudden return from 
a depreciated to an undepreciated currency. 
Whether any depreciation of the currency, in 
the sedse in which that term is generally under- 
stood by the public,  has  actually taken place, 
or to what extent it has taken place, I have long 
had  considerable  doubts.  It appears to me, 
that very great delusion has prevailed, and con- 
tinues  to  prevail,  on this important  question. 
As I have myself been heretofore under the in- 
fluence of this  delusion, I think  it may be  of 
service to state what are the facts, and the in. 
ferences from those facts,  that have led me to 
modify  the opinions  I  have  given  upon  this 
subject. 
The  most sanguine theorists who have written 
on  the  alleged  depreciation  of  the  currency 
must, I think,  have  felt  their  faith  shaken by 
the  passing  events  that  have  occurred  since 
the report  of  the Bullion Committee in 1810, 
and by the facts disclosed in the evidence before 
the committee on the res~~mption  of cash pay- 
ments in 1819. 
There can be no doubt that subsequently to 
the restriction on cash payments in 1797, every 
symptom that indicates an over issue of paper 
circulation,  and  an  alteration  in  the value  of 
the currency, has  manifested itself.  We have 
witnessed a  depressiorl  of  the exchanges, to a 
degree, and for a countinuance, that has been 
unexampled.  We have  had  the market price 
of  gold exceeding the mint price,  far beyond 
the limits that could have occurred if the Bank 
had been fraying in  specie.  We have seen the 
legislature coi~~pelled  to pass  an  act to make 
bank notes a legal tender, in  order to prevent 
an avowed difference between payments in gold 
and payments  in paper.  And all this accom- 
panied by a general rise of price in most of the 
articles of consumable produce. 
Now I have no hesitation  in admitting, that all  the symptoms just  enumerated are indica- 
tions of an excess of currency, and of deprecia- 
tion: and further, that an over issue of currency 
could not exist for any length of time, without 
producing these symptoms. 
I  have,  however,  perfectly  convinced  my 
own mind, that all  the results  above  specified 
may have  arisen  from  causes  not  necessarily 
connected  with  an alteration  in  the  value  of 
currency; and, moreover, that such other causes 
are not hypotl-letical merely, but have been  in 
actual operation. 
Now if  these premises can be substantiated, 
and there should appear to be two hypotheses, 
either  of  which  is  adequate  to  explain  the 
very extraordinary symptoms just  specified,  it 
becomes  an ol~ject  of considerable interest to 
inquire which  of  the two  has  in reality been 
the efficient cause.  The discussion will, in this 
way, resolve itself into a question of fact rather 
than a question of principle ;  and it will remain 
to be decided,  which  explanation  most  satis- 
factorily accounts for the appearances. 
A series of phenomena so remarkable, and so 
connected, cannot have arisen either  fi-om  ac- 
cidental  or fiom trivial  causes : they are of  a 
magnitude too extensive  to be referred to any 
ordinary  interruption  or  fluctuation  of  coin- 
mercial intercourse. I have very little doubt that 
the whole of these appearances may be traced, 
and will  be  found  to have  originated  in  the 
enormous  expenditure  occasioned  by the late 
war,  the exteni of  which  has  perhaps  had no 
parallel either in degree or duration, and never 
before has been combined with a restriction on 
payments in specie by the Bank.  My object is 
to show,  that these  effects  not only may have 
arisen,  but  must  have  arisen,  from  such  an 
enormous and continued expenditure, although 
the currency had remained in its most perfect 
state, and had been invariably kept to the due 
proportion which it ought to bear in relation to 
the commodities to be circulated by it". 
In order not to perplex the argument, it will 
be advisable  to divide  the  subject  into  two 
distinct parts :  in the first  of which I shall en- 
deavour to prove that the  adverse exchanges, 
and the excess of  the market price  above the 
mint price  of  bullion,  were  mainly caused  by 
the large jbreign  expenditure of government ; 
and in the second, that the general rise in the 
price of  all  consumable  produce  was  the ne- 
cessary effect of circumstances connected with 
* I  do  not  pretend to ascertain  that  due  proportion. 
There is  some  ratio  which  ought to subsist  between  the 
total amount of  the currency,  and the total  value  of  the 
commodities to be circulated by it.  If  that ratio be  constant, 
the value of the currency will remain unaltered. the war, and the increased i~lternal  expenditure 
of government. 
.That a large foreign expenditure of govern- 
ment will increase the demand for foreign bills, 
and produce an immediate effect  upon the ex- 
change, is admitted by all practical merchants, 
and by all speculative writers, who have adopted 
the distinction which  has  been  made between 
the nominal and the real exchange. 
It  would be a waste of  time, in  the present 
advanced state of knowledge on this subject, to 
stop to prove, that the real  exchange depends 
upon the proportion which the debts of a nation 
bear  to its credits, or,  in  other words, between 
the payments it has to make and those it has to 
receive.  An increase of demand then on the 
part  of government for foreign  bills  must in- 
crease the premium upon them in proportion to 
its extent.  Some judgment may be formed of 
the effect  of  this  demand, froin  the fact, that 
the news  of  Buonaparte's  landing in France 
from Elba, produced in one post day an advance 
of ten per  cent. on the price  of  foreign  bills, 
arising solely  from  the  anticipation  of  this 
demand *. 
Now  as soon  as  the  advance  in  the  price 
of bills  exceeds  the expenses  of transmitting 
* See  evidence  of  Mr. Haldimand, p. 67. Report  on Re- 
sumption of Cash Payments. 
bullion, the latter, if it can be  procured at the 
usual price, will be sent abroad for the purpose 
of drawing against it, and deriving a profit fiom 
the premium on the bill.  Before the restriction 
act,  bullion  could always  be  procured at the 
Bank by exchanging notes  for coin : the coin 
was immediately exported, either in the state of 
coin, or melted into bullion, and no laws have 
ever been found effectual to  prevent its exporta- 
tion.  An immediate reduction of the currency 
is the necessary consequence.  As the law now 
stands upon this point, the coin is permitted to 
be exported, and therefore no alteration what- 
ever would take place  in the price  of gold so 
long as the merchant exporter could apply at 
the Bank and convert the paper  currency into 
exportable coin.  If, in consequence of the in- 
creased  demand for foreign bills,  gold were  to 
acquire an increased value, the currency by its 
contraction  would  augment  in  value  at the 
same time, and, keeping pace with it, would pre- 
vent any excess of the market price above the 
mint price of gold.  But suppose the currency 
to consist of paper only, and of  paper not con- 
vertible  into  gold,  what  would  then be  the 
effect  of  this  increased  demand  for  foreign 
bills?  In the first place, no gold could be pro- 
cured  at  the  Bank:  the  exchange-merchant 
must apply to the bullion-broker,  who would be perfectly aware of the ob-ject  of the application, 
and would, as  a  matter of course, increase his 
price in proportion  to the proFt  that could be 
derived from its exportation.  Let us take an 
instance :  suppose the demand of government 
has continued long enough to  raise the premium 
on  foreign  bills  ten  per  cent.*,  and that no 
b~lllion  can  be  procured  but  at the  bullion- 
brokers, and at the market price : suppose, too, 
that to transmit  the  bullion  to the  country 
with which the exchange is unfavourable would 
cost in freight, insurance, &c. 2 per cent.  Is it 
not e\ itlent that the holder of bullion, by trans- 
mitting it to the Continent at an expense of 2 
per cent., and drawing against it a bill which he 
could dispose of at a premium of 10 per cent., 
would gain 8 per cent. profit, and without risk. 
To conceive it possible,  after  such an advance 
had taken place in the price  of a foreign bill, 
that  an  exchange  merchant  would  think  of 
offering  the same price as he would have done 
before the advance had taken place, or that the 
bullion-broker would consent to accept it, is to 
* It  may be noticed here, that long  before the premium on 
bills  had risen  to  10 per  cent.,  the bullion  of  the country 
would disappear.  A half per cent, above the charge of  transit 
is sufficient to occasion its export.  IZlhat remains is retained 
for  the purpose of  ~nanufacture,  and it remains  because  the 
price rises so as not to allow a profit  on the export. 
s~ppose  that both the one and the other were 
utterly incompetent to their business.  To  draw 
this  inference  requires  no knowledge  of  the 
practical dealings in exchange.  It  is manifest 
to common sense, that with  such  an alteration 
in the exchange, there must be a correspond- 
ing and proportional  alteration in the price of 
buliion. 
Now, if the paper currency of the kingdom is 
not convertible into coin, what is there in this 
demand for bullion that can have any influence 
on the amount of the currency? If  the currency 
is in its due  proportion to other commodities pre- 
viously to the operation, there is nothing in the 
transaction between the bullion-broker and the 
exchange-merchant,  that  can in  any  way  in- 
fluence the general amount of the currency, or 
alter their proportion.  Nothing more is required 
to insure the profit of  the exchange-merchant, 
but that  bullion  should  remain  steady  in its 
value at the place  to which  he intends to ex- 
port it. 
It is curious to observe,  in the examinations 
of the merchants on this point before  the com- 
mittees  of  1810 and  1819, the  extreme  per- 
plexity they evinced, when pressed  to explain 
how the value of gold could rise partially here, 
without a corresponding rise on the Continent ; 
and wit11 what complacency the examiners seem to have regarded the steadiness of its price on 
the Continent, as a proof that its high price here 
must have arisen from depreciation dependent 
upon over issue, 
Now there is nothing whatever  in the effect 
just described, that in the slightest degree in- 
dicates the currency to have changed its value 
in relation to commodities in  general.  It  marks 
neither more nor less than that gold acquired 
an artificial increase of value in this country, in 
consequence solely of the premium on foreign 
bills. 
The  restriction on the specie payments of the 
Bank virtually precluding the accustomed con- 
traction  of  the currency, it no longer  rose  to 
a level  with  the  gold ;  and the excess  of  the 
market price above the mint price, marked the 
height to which the gold had risen. 
Admittiug then, that if the Bank had been 
paying in  specie,  the difference in the value of 
gold would not have shown itself, would it not 
be a strange confi~sion  to say that the restriction 
was the cause of the increased value ?  It  is the 
premilun on foreign bills that gives the increased 
value to  the gold, and the bank restriction having 
removed the accustomed counteracting remedy, 
occasioned that increase of value to be shown 
by the increase of price. 
It will  be contended,  no doubt, that in ac- 
knowledging the increase of the price of gold, I 
admit the currency no longer to conform to the 
value  of bullion, its only legitimate standard ; 
and that, inasmuch as it will no longer exchange 
for the same quantity of its standard measure, 
it must be considered in a certain sense as de- 
preciated.  This is  perfectly just;  and if the 
term depreciation  was  confined  to this  sense 
alone,  it might with such limitation be freely 
allowed that the currency had been depreciated. 
But this is not the sense in which the term 
depreciation is understood by the public ;  it is 
meant to convey, and does convey, the idea of 
falling below the former level-a  change in its 
value as compared with 011  other commodities. 
The moment the term depreciation is applied to 
the currency,  it is assumed as the cause of the 
increase of prices generally.  If an adverse ex- 
change raises the price of  bullion 20 per cent. 
above the Mint price, it is supposed to account 
for an increase in the price of commodities to  the 
extent of 20 per cent. also ;  than which nothing 
can be more fallacious. 
Advantage is taken of the equivocal meaning 
of  the word,  and inferences  are drawn from it 
which are not warranted.  If this were merely 
a dispute upon terms,  the inquiry would be of 
little importance;  but it is  a  most  essential 
distinction  in fiict,  and a want of' attention to this distinction has been  the principal cause of 
the delusion which has misled so many.  If  any 
term had been invented or adopted, that should 
have expressed  the-rise in  the value  of gold, 
we  should  never  have heard such extravagant 
opinions  respecting  the  depreciation  of  the 
currency.  It is extraordinary that Mr. Baring, 
Mr.  Tooke,  Mr.  Ricardo,  Mr.  Haldimand, 
should all agree in stating, that they know of no 
other  criterion of  depreciation than  the value 
of the  note  as  compared  with  that  of  gold. 
This unqualified  assertion conveys a false im- 
pression,  and  proves  them  not  to have  been 
sufficiently on their guard against the inferences 
that  result  from  the  ambiguity.  They must 
know that cloth,  corn,  manufactures of all de- 
scriptions,  are  criteria  by  which  the  altered 
value  of currency may be determined.  If  no 
change take place  in  the price of these  com- 
modities, it is a tolerably certain proof that the 
currency remains at its level. 
It is  evident, therefore,  they  must  in their 
own minds have limited the signification of the 
word, and have used it in a sense different frorn, 
and more qualified than, that in which it is un- 
derstood by the public.  Mr. Ricardo, indeed, 
expressly  states, that  when  two  commodities 
are compared together, gold and paper for ex- 
ample, it is  i~llpossible  to say  when  they  are 
varying ;  whether  the  one  is  failing,  or  the 
other  is rising.  Nay, he goes so far as to af- 
firm, "  that if the price  of gold  was  at 51.  7s. 
per ounce,  he should say the currency was de- 
preciated  in  proportion  to the  difference  be- 
tween  that price  and the Mint price of gold, 
that is above thirty per cent.,  crlti~ough  the price 
of  all other articles remained the same."  And in 
another part of his evidence he says, "  I think 
it quite possible  that a bank note may be de- 
preciated, although it should rise in value,  if it 
did not  rise in value in a degree equal  to  the 
standard *." 
Now,  as the purchases  and sales  of goods 
will be regulated by their value estimated in the 
currency,  and the currency will  thus  be the 
measure of all contracts between debtor and cre- 
ditor, is it not an inquiry of vast importance to 
ascertain, whether the paper has been steady in 
value,  and the gold risen above the paper;  or 
whether  the  gold  has  been  steady,  and  the 
paper  fallen  below the gold ? 
This question-whether  the currency or the 
gold had altered ?-was  continually put to the 
witnesses by the committee in  1810 and 1819, 
and never received a precise ant1 definite reply. 
To  read the evidence, one would imagine both 
* See evidence of  Mr. Ricardo, pp. 138 and 110.  Report 
on the Resumption of Cash Payments. the examiners  and  the examined  were  alike 
perplexed.  If the witness  affirms,  that gold 
has risen in value because it is  wanted  for  ex- 
portation (which is quite correct), he is imme- 
diately asked, whether  it has risen  in the ge- 
neral market of the commercial world, whether 
there was any greater demand for gold on the 
Continent, or  whether  there was  any scarcity 
in the supply there ?  And as he knows that not 
to be the case, he feels himself bafled and con- 
fused,  and begins  to guess and imagine  any 
thing that will relieve him from the embarrass- 
ment of an apparent contradiction ;  that it is 
wanted for the payment of the armies there, or 
for  metallic circulation,  or for any other pur- 
pose  that  the  examiner  suggests.  Whereas, 
the true  and proper  answer would  have been, 
It has not  risen in the general market of the 
world;  it is  not in greater  dernand  abroad; 
there is  no scarcity in  the  supply  there.  If 
goods  could  be  exported  without  loss,  they 
would  answer  the  purpose  as well  as  gold. 
The demand is  for  foreign  payment,  not  for 
gold ;  and it rises in value in this country, and 
this country alone,  because  the eschange has 
become so adverse as to create a large premium 
on a foreign bill,  and a profit is to be obtained 
by the export of gold.  The steadiness  of its 
value abroad is the circumstance that renders 
the profit certain.  On this account the holder 
of gold will not part with  it,  and transfer the 
power of making the profit to another person, 
unless  at an advance in  its price;  which  ad- 
vance will  be  exactly measured  by  the differ- 
ence between the premium on the bill,  and the 
cost  of transmitting the bullion, with  a small 
additional deduction of perhaps a half per cent., 
constituting the profit of the exchange-merchant 
who conducts the operation. 
Now,  although  this  effect  of  an  increased 
price of  bullion  could  only take place  within 
very  narrow  limits,  supposing  the  currency 
were convertible into coin or bullion, it might 
take place  to any extent  when  the  currency 
was inconvertible, depending upon the amount 
of foreign payment to be made,  and yet with- 
out deranging the just  and natural proportion 
between the currency and the usual commodi- 
ties that are to be circulated by it. 
The price  of corn, of cloth,  of every other 
commodity,  might remain precisely the same, 
and nothing  alter but the price of gold.  Not 
only  might it vary  to any extent without al- 
tering the price of these  articles, but for any 
length  of  time  too,  provided  the foreign  ex- 
penditure  continued  upon  the  same  scale 
that first  induced the adverse  exchange,  and 
was  constantly  creating  a  fresh  adverse  ba- lance, as the export of bullion or of other corn- 
nlodities  was  tending  to  liquidate  it.  Tllis 
would depend on the extent of foreign payment 
required to meet an extraordinary exertion, and 
on the difficulties  which  might be thrown  in 
the way of  providing for  that  payment by the 
export of goods.  For the bullion that could be 
procured  to meet a  large foreign expenditure 
would  be  very  limited,  and  would  disappear 
almost immediately unless kept  in the couiltry 
by increase of price. 
It will be  objected,  no doubt, that the case 
which  I have supposed does not apply to the 
actual circumstances we have witnessed  during 
the late war ;  inasmuch, as the price of produce 
rose,  and indicated  the same depreciation  of 
the currency  in regard  to all  other  cornino- 
dities as in relation to gold.  Of this I am per- 
fectly aware, but I have no doubt of being able 
to prove,  that this  general rise  in  price was 
the  result  of  another  cause  acting  simulta- 
neously  with  that  which  produced  the  high 
price  of  gold, but equally independent of any 
previous  alteration in  the  value  of  corrency. 
That it was in fact the result of circumstances 
connected with  the war,  and the increased es- 
penditure  of  government  within  the country, 
creating  a  demand,  which  could  not be  sup- 
plied except at an increase of price.  Now,  if 
I prove this, and moreover that the increase of 
price  would  of  necessity  arise,  although  the 
currency remained  at its level ;  then the ar- 
gument  remains  untouched  by  the objection, 
and  is  applicable  in  all  its force  as  far  as 
relates  to  the  high  market  price  of  gold. 
The discussion  of  this  point  would  lead  me 
prematurely  into  the  second  division  of  my 
subject, and I must  postpone for the present 
any investigation  of this topic;  only  begging 
my reader will not suffer his attention to be di- 
verted  from the immediate subject of inquiry, 
aix.  whether  the  excess  of  the market  price 
above the mint price  of  gold is a fact,  when 
taken  alone,  that necessarily implies an altera- 
tion in the value of the currency. 
It will  be asked, however,  does not this ex- 
cess  imply  a  derangement  in  the  currency? 
Does it not imply a greater amount of circu- 
lating medium  than could have  existed under 
similar  ci~~cun~stances,  if  the  Bank  had  been 
paying  in  specie?  Undoubtedly  it does.  If 
the  Bank  had  not  been  restricted  from  cash 
payments,  such a state of affairs must have led 
to a contraction of their issues;  and the conse- 
quence  wouldhave  been, that  the  value of the cur- 
rency would have been elevated to the artificial 
value which the adverse exchange had given to 
the gold, and thus the difference  between the market and the mint price of gold would have 
disappeared. 
This was the accustomed mode in which tte 
currency kept on a level  with  gold  previously 
to the restriction act, in 1797; but it is evident, 
that,  where  the  increased  value  of gold  was 
occasioned  by  an  adverse  exchange,  such  a 
change in the amount of circillation did not re- 
store  a depreciated  currency to  its  level;  it 
raised the currency from its natural level to an 
artificial elevation ;  and  thus, by an imperceptible 
influence, kept  the currency apparently of an 
uniform value, and the exchanges steady. 
It is clear,  however, that this apparent uni- 
formity of value was in truth a real fluctuation ; 
and unless it had been  confined within mode- 
rate limits, might have become a positive evil; 
and  an  evil,  too,  that  scarcely  admits  of  a 
remedy,  unless  the currency  can be so  regu- 
lated  as always to bear  its just  proportion  to 
the wants  of  the community, and can be con- 
tinued at that exact proportion during the fluc- 
tuations  of  the  exchange.  But  how  is  the 
currency to be so regulated? And to whorr~  is 
the regulation to be committed? To  the bank- 
directors  ?  By no means.  Much of unmerited 
odium, as I believe these gentlemen to have in- 
curred, and giving them all possible credit for 
the  moderation  and  forbearance  with  which 
they have exercised the power so improvidently 
committed to them ; I am confident,  that no 
lldman being,  or corporation of human beings, 
is capable of executing so important a trust, as 
th;~t  of proportioning the amount of the circu- 
lating medium to the wants of the community. 
It is  utterly  impracticable  to calculate what 
amount of currency would be required, for the 
purposes  of  distributing  the annual  produce 
amongst  its consumers.  No human  foresight 
could anticipate  the contingencies that might 
occur.  If  such calculations were possible, we 
should  at  once attain  that great desideratum 
in  political  economy,  an  uniform  measure  of 
value:  but not possessing  such powers  of cal- 
culation,  we  have  no alternative but to adopt 
that circulating medium which is least liable to 
variation,  and  to  leave  it  to  find  its  level 
among the different nations  of the colnmercial 
world, by export or import, by  melting or coin- 
ing, as circumstances may denote the necessity 
of  these changes.  Such was the state of our 
currency  before  the restriction  act, in  1797. 
No  other checks againstfl~lctuation  then existed, 
and  they  were  found  sufficient  for  all  prac- 
tical purposes, and in the main salutary in their 
operation. 
After this examination  it may  be  assumed, that provided  the paper be not convertible at 
option into  coin  or  bullion,  the price of gold 
will  be  advanced  by  an  adverse  exchange; 
and yet,  that the currency may remain at its 
natural level,  that is, unaltered in value, and be 
maintained  in  its  exact  and  perfect  relative 
proportion to the commodities to be circulated 
by it. 
Let us then, before we quit  this  branch  of 
the investigation,  examine the facts disclosed 
by the evidence before the committees of 1810 
and 1819; and see how far they tend to inva- 
lidate or confirm this opinion. 
Assuming that the price of gold,  when  the 
currency  is not convertible into bullion,  may 
be augmented by either of  two causes, that is, 
by an adverse exchange, or by an over-issue of 
paper;  it  might  afford  strong  ground of  in- 
ference which of the two had been the operating 
cause,  according  as  a  connexion  could  be 
traced between  the one or the other with  the 
changes in the price of gold. 
Upon this point, the tables published in the 
Appendix to the Report of  1819 offer  ample 
instruction.  Not  only is  there  a  general  ac- 
cordance between  the exchanges and price of 
bullion  whether  rising or falling, but if taken 
for  any long  periods  of  time  the  connexion 
may  be  stated  to be  absolutely  invariable*. 
Whilst, on the contrary, no such connexion has 
subsisted between  the amount of Bank issues 
and the high price of gold :  nay,  so far from it, 
that for months together they are found to run 
in opposite directions. 
It  was this want of connexion, between the 
amount of Bank notes and the price of bullion, 
that first led me to suspect the accuracy of the 
theory,  that attributed the high  price  of gold 
to  the over-issues of the Bank;  and the sus- 
picion  gave way to absolute  conviction  upon 
the events  that took  place  on  the  peace  in 
1814, and the return of Bonaparte from Elba, 
in 1815, 
When the war  ceased in 1814, the price of 
gold  bullion  was  five guineas per ounce,  that 
* Some few discordant instances  occur  of  trivial  import, 
and  trivial  amount,  where  a  specific  quantity  of  gold  and 
silver might  be  wanted for consignment on the  sailing of an 
Indian  Fleet,  or  for  the immediate  supply  of  Government; 
and  one or  two slight discrepancies are also pointed out by 
Mr.  Baring.  So  far,  however,  are they from  shaking his 
conviction  as  to the necessary correspondence  between  the 
exchange and the price of bullion, that he attributes them en- 
tirely  to some  inaccuracy in  the statements of  price by the 
bullion-brokers  of the Bank j  for he observes, that such dis- 
crepancies wodld be impossible if the price of  gold were cor- 
rectly  reported.-See  Report of  Committee  on  Cash  Pay- 
meuts, p. 186.  See also Evidence of  Mr. Holland,  p.  116. is  nearly  thirty  per  cent.  above  the  mint 
price, and  it had  been  at that price  upon  an 
average,  ever  since the latter end of the year 
1812.  Fsom May, 18141,  it fell gradually, and 
was  at 41.  9s.  per ounce before  the  following 
Marcli, the exchange experiencing, pari passu, 
a corre:po:lding  improvement:  on  the arrival 
of the news  of Bonaparte's  landing in France 
from  Elba,  the exchange varied  at once  ten 
per  cent.  and  continued  falling,  whilst  the 
price of  gold mounted as rapidly to 51.  5s. per 
ounce.  All the symptoms that had been con- 
sidered as indicating a depreciation of the cur- 
rency  previously to the peace  of 1814, imme- 
diately  manifested  themselves,  and  continued 
during the  one hundred days  of' Bonapnrte's 
power.  The battle  of ltTaterloo again put an 
end to the war,  and from that moment the ex- 
change  grazually  recovered.  The  price  of 
gold fell back proportionably, and in the course 
of  the  following  year  was  at 31.  18s. 6h  per 
ounce, that is within 74d. of the mint price. 
During the  whole  of  this  period  there was 
but little variation in the Bank issues,  thc nu- 
merical amount of the notes  in the beginning 
of  1814 and  the  end  of  1315  being  about 
twenty-five  millions.  They  had  been  at one 
time in the course  of the tiyo years as high  as 
twenty-eight miilions; but, by a perversity most 
unfortunate for the theory of depreciation, the 
issues  of notes  were  continually  augmenting 
whilst the exchanges were improving,  and the 
price  of gold falling:  these  events  speak  vo- 
lumes.  In the  midst  of peace,  when  all  the 
symptoms of  depreciation were gradually sub- 
siding, when commodities were selling at prices 
corresponding  with  the amount then in circu- 
lation,  a  great political  event occurs,  entailing 
the  of  a  new  war and of a great 
foreign  expenditure.  In an  instant,  without 
any change in the amount of circulation, or of 
consumable  produce,  the  exchanges  fall  be- 
tween  twenty and thirty  per  cent.;  arid  the 
price  of gold  mounts in  the same  proportion 
above the inint price.  This state continues for 
one hundred days, and at  the expiration of that 
period,  when  the battle  of Waterloo and  the 
march  of  the allies  to Paris put an end to all 
further  expectation  of  a  continuance  of' the 
war,  the currency still  maintaining its relative 
proportion to commodities, all  the movements 
begin to retrograde, and every thing returns to 
its foriner state of quiescence. 
If the  symptoms that  occurred  during this 
short interval are to be considered asproofs  of an 
alteration in the  value of the currency, it  is in vain 
to continue the argument.  To my mind they demonstrate incontestably, that the anticipation 
of lt  large foreign expenditure acted suddenly 
and powerfully  on the exchange, and, as sud- 
denly, through the intervention of the exchange, 
on the price of gold. 
If  alterations in the amount of the currency 
had been  the moving force, the price of gold 
instead  of rising  ought  to have  fallen.  Can 
there be  a  doubt then,  that  in  this  case the 
gold was  raised for  a  time above  the level  of 
the  currency and afterwards fell back  to it? 
And if in this case, why not in others that oc- 
curred previously to the peace  of 1814,  when 
the same disturbing forces were in action ? 
This fa'ct alone throws  all the onus probandi 
on the advocates fbr depreciation ;  and yet, in 
the evidence they gave before  the committee 
on the resumption of cash payments, they were 
utterly  unable  to give  even  a  plausible  ex- 
planation  of  these  contradictions.  Instances 
without end are adduced before the committee 
of 1819, not only of a want of connexion between 
the Bank  issues and the high price of  bullion, 
but of  a  direct opposition between them, and 
that not for short periods, but for months and 
years ;  and it is quite impossible to lend oneself 
to the various futile attempts that are made  to 
reconcile the inconsistencies *.  If an accidental 
coincidence can be traced between an enlarged 
issue of Bank notes, and an augmentation in the 
pice of bullion, it is immediately insisted upon 
as cause and effect.  When the want of coinci- 
denceis pointedout,  then the witness replies, that 
the numerical amount of  Bank issues  is not to 
be considered as any criterion of excess of cir- 
culation,  or the contradiction  is attributed  to 
some alleged  interference  of the issues of' the 
country  banks.  When  again  the  witness  is 
asked, whether the amount of country paper is 
riot regulated by that of the Bank of England ? 
then the difficulty  is referred  to excessive  im- 
portations occasioning stagnation of commerce. 
* I subjoin the reference to some of  the instances alludecl 
to. 
Bank notes.  Price of gold.  - 
L.  s.  a. 
April to June,  1815  27 millions  5  4  0 
July to Decem.  181 7  29 millions  4  0  6 
July to Decem. 1818  26 millions  4  2  6 
Evidence of  Mr. Ward,  p. 74, 
1813  24 millions  5  10  0 
1817  28millions  4  6  0 
Evidence of Mr. Tooke, p. 129. 
Latter part of 1817  29 millions  4  0  6 
1819  25  millions  4  3  0 
From July 1615 to Decem. 
1816,  three  half  pears 
steadily at  9  18  6 In short, the high price  of  bullion  is never  to 
be accounted  for  by  the  adverse  exchange; 
but both the one and the other are attributed, 
as a matter of course, to the over issue of cir- 
culating medium.  Indeed Mr. Ricardo, whose 
opinions upon subjects connected with political 
economy  will  always  be  received  with  the 
deference due to one whose  writings  have  so 
much  contributed  to the  advancement  of  the 
science,  entertains such very peculiar  notions 
on the subject of exchanges, that I do not see 
how he can attain a correct view of the bearings 
of this  question;  for he  seems to maintain in 
all  his  publications,  that the variations  of  the 
exchange arise solely from the variations in the 
comparative value of the currencies of difl'erent 
countries, and does not admit that the exchange 
is  dependant  upon  the balance  of  debts  and 
credits.  Mr. Wheatley, as far as I know, first 
stated this opinion in his work on the theory of 
inoney  and commerce;  and  it  seems  to have 
been adopted in its fill1 extent by Mr. Ricardo. 
As the opinions of these gentlemen are peculiar 
to themselves, and, in my mind,  absolutely nn- 
tenable and at variance with facts, I must, with 
all due respect for the weight of such authority, 
think  it unnecessary  to  dwell  upon  them; I 
shall  merely state a  circutnstat~ce  that I  con- 
sider conclusive upon the subject. 
I put this  question to one of  our principal 
exchange-merchants :-"  If',  in  time  of  pro- 
found  peace,  with  the  currencies  of  France 
and Engiand upon a perfect level in  regard to 
commodities,  and the  exchange  at par,  you 
were to be  informed that the English govern- 
lllent  had, for  some purpose, no matter what, 
determined  to transmit  a  subsidy,  or  loan, or 
present  of  ten millions to the government of 
France, would you, after the receipt of that in- 
formation, draw upon Paris upon the same terms 
as  before?"  The answer was, "  Undoubtedly 
not.  I should be aware that such an intention 
ii~ust  increase the ciemaind for foreign bills, and 
I would not grant a bill except at an increased 
premium."  Now as the terms upon which this 
gentleman  woulct  draw upon  Paris  wouId,  in 
fact, be  quoted,  as the  exchange  of  the day, 
there  needs  little  further arguwent to prove, 
that the amount of payments to be made com- 
pared with  those to be  received,  must  have  a 
decisive  ilifluence  on  the  exchange.  lTTliiIst 
considering this part of the subject, it may be 
advisable  to point  out a  material  distinction, 
which, from not being sufficiently attended to, 
has led to considerable confusion on the subject 
of exchange. 
It  is perfectly true,  that if a difference take 
place in the relative  value of the currencies of two countries, in consequence of one of  them 
having increased the atnount  of its circulation 
so as generally to affect prices, such an altera- 
tion  will  immediately  show  itself  in  the  ex- 
change.  The  depreciated  currency  of  one 
country will no longer buy the same amount of 
the currency of  the other.  This would be an 
adverse  exchange arising solely from deprecia- 
tion.  Such a derangement can only be remedied 
by a removal of the cause, that is,  by contract- 
ing  the  currency,  and  reducing  the  excess 
which occasions tl~e  depreciation.  In this case, 
the alteration of the currency is the cause, and 
the adverse exchange is the effect.  This accords 
with  the  theory  of  Mr.  Wheatley  and  Mr. 
Ricardo, who suppose that no fluctuation can 
occur in the exchange without a preuious  fluc- 
tuation in the currency.  But it is equally true, 
that the same apparent difference in the relative 
value  of the  two  currencies will  show  itself, 
when from a disturbance of the relative ainoiint 
of exports and inlports an alteration  first takes 
place in the exchange; and this  apparent dif- 
ference may be produced without any real dif- 
ference in the value of the two currencies. 
For it would take place between t\vo countries 
making use of the sanle metallic currency.  In 
the case above s~lpposed  of  the  currencies of 
England and Frar~ce  being in the most perfect 
state  and  a  large  payment  of  ten 
for  subsidy  being  to be  made  from 
London to Paris, the premium on foreign  bills 
rise.  Suppose it were to rise  1 per cent., 
it  would  then require 2101 to purchase a bill 
upon  Paris  for  2100 ; or  2101 of  English 
currency would appear to be of no more value 
than 2100  of  French  currency,  although not 
the slightest  change  took  place in the propor- 
tion between the currencies of either country, 
relatively to the commodities to be  circulated 
in each*.  This fluctuation would  be rectified 
+  I am quite at  a loss how to reconcile  such  an exchange 
with  the theory of  Mr.  Wheatley and  Mr.  Ricardo;  for  it 
is easy to collceive an intercourse  between trading nations of 
the follo~ring  description.  England might send hardware to 
Spain,  Spain  might  send  wool  to  France, and France send 
wine  to England;  in  which  case  the respective  debts  and 
credits would be liquidated  through  a circuitous  remittance, 
known technically by the term arbitration of  eschange.  The 
direct exchanges, Iionrever, between England and Spain n ould 
be  in  favour  of  England;  between  Spain  and  France,  i11 
fa!  our of  Spain ;  and betmeen  France and England, in favour 
of  France.  If these  exchanges  are to  be considered  as in- 
dicating a  corresponding  difereiice  in the value  of  the re- 
spective currencies, it would follow that the currency of  Eng- 
land  was  more  valuable  than  that of  Spain;  that of  Spain 
more valuable than the currency of France ; and the currency 
of  France more  valuable  than  that of  England:  that  is,  A 
greater  than  B,  B  greater  than  C,  and C  greater  than A, 
which is evidently impossible.  The contradiction arises from 
tra~lsferrin~  that language  to the currency n  hich is only ap- 
plicable to the bills. quickly,  if  no  obstruction  to  the  commercial 
intercourse between the two nations interposed; 
because  the $1  of  premium  on  the bill  upon 
France would  be an extra profit  upon all ex- 
ports, and a diminution  of  profit  upon  all im- 
ports, and thus the derangement would be re- 
moved by an  alteration  in  the  proportion  be- 
tween the credits and the debts. 
In addition to this remetiy from the exports 
and imports, there is another powerful auxiliary 
to rectify  the  fluctuations  of  the  exchange. 
For as soon  as the premium  on  a  foreign  bill 
has exceeded tl:e  limits  which  will  repay the 
exporter the expenses  of  transmitting bullion, 
the coin itself will  be  exported  in payment  of 
the adverse balance.  This will  lead to a con- 
traction of the currency, and an artificial eleva- 
tion  of  its  value ; and  this  elevation  of  the 
value  of the currency, lowering  the prices  of 
produce,  will still  further increase  the profits 
upon esport, and diminish the profits upon im- 
port.  Not  so,  however,  when,  after  the dis- 
appearance of  the coin,  the currency consists 
of paper, and of paper not convertible into specie. 
As soon  as  this  step  is  taken,  some  of  the 
essential correctives which  tend to restore  the 
exchanges are removed : for, first, the price of 
bullion will then rise exactly to the point where 
it ceases to be profitable to export it ;  and con- 
sequently the remedy from the export of bullion 
can no longer be applied.  And, secondly, the 
prices  of  all  other  commodities  will  not  full. 
~~w  it is this  fall  of price,  arising  from  the 
forced contraction,  that enables the exporting 
merchant to gain augmented profits upon all his 
exports;  he would  buy cheaper here, arid  sell 
at the same price abroad.  For the same reason 
he could  not  import so advantageously  as be- 
fore;  for he would buy at the same price abroad, 
and must  sell cheaper here.  The exchanges, 
therefore, could not, after the restriction, right 
themselves  so  rapidly.  There would  then be 
left but onc correcting remedy;  viz. the extra 
profit arising from the premium of the exchange 
on  all  exports,  and  the  corresponding  dimi- 
nution of profit upon all imports. 
It is clear, too,  that the exchange would be- 
come more and more adverse in the compound 
ratio of the extent of payment to be made, and 
the difficulties thrown in the way of exportation. 
At the time  of the Milan  decrees being  cn- 
forced,  and when  the ports  of  the Continent 
were shut against English goods, the depression 
of the exchange would  no longer be measured 
by the accustoined test of the expenses of trans- 
lllitting bullion.  The exporter would have to 
contend against the charges on the conveyance 
of bulky goods ;  he must incur the expense and 
risk  of  gaining  admission  for  his  goods,  and when admitted, would have to sell them at low 
prices,  in  consequence  of  the  supply  being 
so  much  beyond  the  usual  demand for  con- 
sumption ". 
It might therefore  be expected, that during 
tlle continuance of  the large foreign expendi- 
ture the exchanges would continue  to be  ad- 
verse  in  a  much  greater  degree  than  could 
have  arisen  under  ordinary  circumstances.- 
As soon,  however, as  the foreign  expenditure 
ceased, this sole  remaining remedy was found 
effectual  in  improving  the  exchanges,  and 
lowering the price  of  gold.  For long  before 
the resumption of cash payments, the exchanges 
were  gradually  approaching  to  par,  and  the 
price  of  gold  to the mint price.  Up to the 
time of the passing Mr. Peel's  bill in  1819, this 
improvement was in progress,  notwithstanding 
a considerable increase of Bank issues above the 
amount circulating in 181  3. 
The  country paper is said to have been mnch 
diminished  between  the years 1813 and 1819. 
I  have  not  been  able  to  ascertain  to  what 
* Some estimate  of the extent  of  these  difficulties, and of 
the  expenses  of  sending goods  to  the  Continent,  may  be 
formed from  the fact, that  during  the Milan  decre'es  the  in- 
surance against the  risk  of  seizure  in the  ports of  the Baltic 
could not be effected  for  a  less  preminm  than  from 20 to 30 
per cent. 
degree the contraction  took  place;  and cer- 
tainly, whatever it might be, as it was previous 
to the passing of Mr. Peel's bill, it could not he 
to that measure. 
There is positively no ground for supposing 
that Mr. Peel's  bill produced  any effect  what- 
ever  upon  the value  of  the currency.  I am 
convinced that the exchanges and the price of 
gold  would  have  subsided  tranquilly  to their 
level,  if that bill  had  never been  passed,  and 
without any effort  on  the part of the Bank to 
contract their issues.  Indeed,  looking at tlle 
last retusns of the issues of Bank paper, it does 
not appear to me that the directors have talcen 
any steps whatever to contract their notesm,  or 
that  the  amount  of the  circulating  medium, 
taking the notes  and new coin  together, is  in 
any degree less than it was at the time of pass- 
ing the bill, and certainly nothing lilic so low as 
it was in  I 8 13. 
I have thought it right to make this sl~ort  di- 
gression  on  the  subject  of  the cxcha~lges,  be- 
cause I observe a  constant disposition  on  the 
part of  some of the witnesses bcfore the com- 
* This is now stated from antl~orit~.  The Bank lins never 
made  any  preparation  for  cash  payments  by  contraction  of 
their issues.  The Bank directors I~aye,  on the contrary,  been 
quite ready to make  ndvanccs  upon bills,  but  the rncrcl~allts 
have not applied fAr  them. mittee on the resumption of cash payments, to 
represent the exchanges as dependent upon the 
estimation in which  foreigners might hold tbe 
value of our pound sterling.  Now, if the value 
of our pound sterling, as compared with foreign 
money,  would  be equally affected  either  by a 
depreciation of the currency, or  by an adverse 
exchange with an undepreciated currency, it is 
a complete petitio principii  to attribute the fo- 
reigner's  estitnation of our pound sterling to  his 
guesses  at the depreciation  of our circulating 
medium.  The  foreigner would be as well aware 
as ourselves that the adverse exchange enabled 
him to purchase a bill  payable in our currency 
with  a smaller amount of  the currency of  his 
own  country,  in  exact  proportion  to the de- 
pression of the exchange. 
Having past experience alone for a guide, it 
was not an unlikely mistake for theorists to fall 
into, that such an adverse exchange could only 
arise from depreciation.  For no such exchange 
had ever before arisen without an acknowledged 
depreciation;  as, for  instance,  that which  oc- 
curred  previously  to  the  reformation  of  the 
gold  coin  in  17744.  And  it  is  demonstrable, 
that  no  such  adverse  exchange  could  have 
taken place now, but for  the restriction  on the 
Bank.  It  seemed,  then,  a  natural  inference, 
that the Bank being relieved from the necessity 
of  payments, t~nci  taken advantage of the 
privilege;  and  having  created  a  depreciation 
by over issue, had produced those evils,  which 
hacl never before been known to arise from any 
other cause. 
It was  stated  in  the  evidence  on  the  re- 
sumption of cash payments*, that on the return 
of  Buonaparte from  Elba, the pound  sterling 
fell, in one post, on the Royal Exchange, to the 
extent of 10 per cent. ;  and this statement gave 
rise  to the  following  questions  and  answers. 
cc Have you ever known such a fluctuation un- 
c6 connected  with political causes?  Such fluc- 
cc tuations I have never known unconnected with 
"  bank-paper ;  they are caused by speculation 011 
"  the  price of the paper.-Have  you ever known 
"  that fluctuation with paper unconnected with 
"  some political event  ? I have never known that 
"  fluctuation in so short a time,  which I should 
"  call an anticipation of the  f~~ture  value of paper 
"  currency, except fsom political causes." 
Here it is evident that the witness is answer- 
ing under  the bias  of  a  preconceived  theory. 
He is fully persuaded ofthe depreciation of the 
note (which  he  afterwards  distinctly  avows), 
and he states his opinion  that the depreciation 
* See page 67,  Report  on  the  Resumption  of  Cash  Pay- 
ments. of the note is the cause of the adverse exchange, 
and of tlie  high price of bullion.  Whereas, if 
he had felt at the time a convictioll  that there 
would  be precisely the same  difference in the 
apparent value of the note from an adverse real 
exchange, and that the exchange was the cause 
of the apparent depreciation, his answer would 
have  been-I  11avc never  known  such  a  fluc- 
tuation but from political causes, and I should 
refer  it to an  anticipation  of  an adverse  ex- 
change,  urhicll  would  necessarily  follow  the 
large  demand  of  government  for  foreign  ex- 
pendit~ire. 
After this investigation, I may at least assrune 
that there  are two modes  of viewing this im- 
portant question : that there are two modes of 
accounting for tlie remarkable fluctuations that 
occurred, both  in  the price of bullion  and the 
exchanges. 
It  is  quite clear,  at all events,  that the high 
price ofgold bullion is not a necessary criterion 
of the currency llnvi~lg  fallen  below its proper 
level ;  and the ~.eadcr  must decide to wilich of 
the causes lie will  attribute the extraordinary 
effects  that have  taken place.  I11  making up 
his mind, he woultl do well  to reflect,  that for 
the  theory of  depreciation  there  is  no proof 
whatever, save that which arises from the sym- 
ptoms alone.  That this proof amounts to little 
more  than an argument in a  circle.  The de- 
preciation is assumed as a test of  over issue of 
currency, and the over issue is inferred, because 
there is a depreciation ;  whereas, if he takes an 
increased foreign payment  as the cause of an 
adverse exchange, he takes for his basis an ac- 
knowledged fact, and from  that fact he traces 
a  demonstrable  result.  He does  not  argue 
from  sy~nptoms  back  to a  conjectural  cause, 
but he has  an  d priori  demonstration, that  a 
large foreign  expenditure must  create an  ad- 
verse  exchange.  That an  adverse  exchange 
must, at all  times, and with  the most  perfect 
metallic currency, give the appearance of a fall 
in the value of our circulating medium as com- 
pared with that of other countries, and with an 
inconsertible currency, must raise  the price  of 
gold,  without  necessarily  interferini with  the 
price of other comtnodities.  Having established 
this foundation, abstractedly from  all practical 
application, he has the opportunity of comparing 
how the two theories correspond with the series 
of'  events. 
If  any one will be at the pains of reading the 
evidence before the Bullion Committee in 1810 
and 1819, taking along with  him this  key, he 
will find the theory of depreciation  opposed at 
every turn by facts in direct opposition  to it. 
Exchanges  favourable when they ought to be adverse ;  gold high when  it ought to be low ; 
and contradictions and inconsistencies without 
end ;  while  the other theory has no difficulties 
to overcome, save such as may arise from our 
ignorance of the operations of government, and 
the precise  amount of  the foreign expenditure 
at any particular period of time.  He  will  find 
the  exchange  most  adverse,  when  we  were 
making the greatest exertions abroad, either by 
our own military operations, or the subsidies to 
assist the military operations of our allies.  He 
will find the evils aggravated, when obstructions 
were thrown in the way of our exports by the 
Milan decrees, or by large importations of corn. 
He  will find the unfavourable aspects assume a 
different  appearance  at the close  of the war, 
and be renewed  during the  hundred  days  of 
~uona~arte's  return from Elba ;  and, in  short, 
that general accordance between the events, and 
the actual or probable  expenditure of govern- 
ment*,  which could hardly be expected, unless 
they were connectedascause andeffect. When the 
expenditure of government ceased, the adverse 
symptoms disappeared, and we passed gradually 
* Mr. Rothschild  states  the  expenditure of  the  British 
government in  the  years 1814 and  1815 to have been  im- 
mense, and that it lowered the exchange nearly 30 per cent, 
See Report  on Resumnption of Cash Payments, p. 160. 
alld easily into our natural state, so far, at  least, 
as regarded our relation with foreign countries. 
Having disposed of  this part of  the inquiry, 
we shall now be better prepared for examining 
the remaining  division  of  the subject, and for 
investigating the cause of that general increase 
of  price  of  almost  all  consumable  commo- 
dities which  forms such  a  striking feature in 
this  question,  and which has been  considered 
as another decisive proof of the depreciation of 
our currency. 
If  I have been siiccessful in convincing  my 
reader, that with  a currency in the most uni- 
form state in regard to other commodities, the 
high price  of  gold was the unavoidable  result 
of our large foreign expenditure, and no proof 
whatever of a general depreciation of the cur- 
rency,  his  mind  will  naturally  be  more  dis- 
posed to admit any reasoning that may account 
for the rise of prices, without having recourse 
to the same theory.  I have already stated, that 
this general increase of  prices  depended upon 
causes connected with the war, and the increased 
internal expenditure of government, and would 
have  occurred  although the currency had  re- 
mained  at its natural  level.  I shall  now  en- 
deavour to establish this  position, without any 
reference  to the previous  reasoning respecting 
the high price of gold.  The two parts of  the argument  being  thus  conducted  upon  inde- 
pendent grounds, will re-act upon  each  other, 
and tend to the confirmation of both. 
The first obvious cause of high prices is the 
increase of taxation.  Upon this point there has 
been some difference of opinion, but none that 
has  any  immediate  practical  bearing  on  the 
question.  It has, indeed, been contended, that 
if taxes could be fairly distributed, so that each 
person  should pay his  proportionate  share ac- 
cording  to the income  he  possessed, taxation 
would  have  but little  effect in  raising  price; 
it would  only tend to diminish the income of 
those who paid the tax*. 
In  our present state of  society, such a  dis- 
tribution is quite impossible.  In the first place, 
the income of  the labourer  is not much more 
than sufficient to keep up the class of labourers; 
and although I have  little  doubt that a very 
large amount ofthe taxes is paid  by this class, 
yet they could  not  contribute  any thing like 
their individual proportion,  without  impairing 
the funds absolutely necessary for subsistence. 
Notwithstanding, therefore, that in consequence 
of  their  numbers,  they  probably  pay  a  large 
share, they do not pay their proportionate share, 
* See evidence of Mr. Tooke, Committee on  Agriculture, 
p. 292. 
considering  how limited their enjoyments 
are, it is to be hoped they never will. 
The fact  is,  that the taxes are chiefly laid 
upon  articles  of  consumption,  and  are gene- 
rally imposed successively and partially.  Such 
taxes,  when levied  on the producers,  are im- 
mediately repaid to them in the increased price 
of  the article,  and fall  upon  the  consumer; 
and the result is  inevitable,  because  the pro- 
ducer has the remedy in his own hands.  Unless 
the public will at once consent to pay the in- 
creased  price, he will  lessen the supply till his 
object is attained, and without which he could 
not continue his business.  Part of the increased 
prices,  therefore,  paid  for  all articles  of  con- 
sumption during the war,  has  been  owing  to 
the  increase  of  taxation,  and  would  be  con- 
founded  with  the  increased  prices  supposed 
to arise from  a  depreciation  of  the currency. 
Again, there  are very  few  articles  consumed 
by  the most  indigent  classes  of  society,  that 
are not in some way, more  or less remote, de- 
pendent on the importation of foreign produce. 
The raw  material  of  many,  even the coarsest 
manufactures,  is  imported  directly ;  various 
articles used in dying, and other  processes  of 
manufacture,  are not the productions  of  our 
climate.  Tea,  sugar,  and other varieties  of 
food, come to us from abroad.  Upon all these coinmodities there is, during war,  an increased 
charge from  high  freights, insurance, and ex- 
traordinary duties of Customs ;  all these are so 
Inany sources of additional cost, and are causes 
of high prices, totally independent of deprecia- 
tion.  But the increase of prices does not stop 
here.  If the articles consumed by the labour- 
ing poor become  dear fiom taxation, and from 
the other causes just enumerated, the wages of 
labour will  rise;  and it becomes  a  subject of 
inquiry whether this increase  of wages  can be 
charged to the consumer  in the same manner 
as the taxes. 
Every  manufacturer  is  aware,  that  during 
the pressure  of unusual  demand,  he can well 
afford  to pay higher  wages  to his  workmen ; 
because he not only reimburses himself for the 
extra advances, but is  enabled  to increase  the 
price of his articles so as to augment his profits 
also.  In a particular  case  then, his  power  of 
adding  wages  to the price will  depend upon 
the demand colnpared with the means of supply- 
ing that demand.  But the same reasoning will 
apply  to  the  whole  mass  of  manufacturers, 
provided  a  general  demand  arises  for  their 
commodities beyond  the customary powers  of 
supply* 
The community  consists  of  two  classes  of 
persons, one of which consumes and reproduces, 
,tile other consumes without reproduction.  If 
all the society consisted of producers, it wouId 
be  of  little  consequence  at what  price  they 
,xchanged  their  commodities  amongst  each 
other ;  but those who are only consumers form 
too numerous a class to be overlooked.  Their 
powers  of  demanding  arise from  rents,  mort- 
gages,  annuities,  professions,  and services  of 
various descriptions rendered to  the community. 
The  higher the price at which the class of con- 
sumers can be made to  buy, the greater will be 
the profit of  the producers  upon  the mass  of 
commodities which they sell to them ;  hence it 
becomes  an object of  great importance  to in- 
quire in what degree the demands of the con- 
sumers  may  vary in relation  to the means  of 
production. 
Now,  amongst the  class who  are only con- 
sumers, government holds the most prominent 
station; and before  the  subject  can be satis- 
factorily investigated,  we  must examine more 
closely the effects produced by its expenditure. 
Dr. Hamilton  states, that from  the year  1793 
to 1815, both years inclusive, the sum of nearly 
609  millions  of sterling  money  was  borrowed 
by the English government*. 
If the expenditure of this enormous amount 
* Hamilton on the National Debt, Table 3,  Appendix. co~lld  be considered as an extra demand, in ad- 
dition  to the ordinary denland  of  the society, 
there would  be but little difficulty in account- 
ing for the increase of  prices during the war; 
and were I content  to build  an argument  on 
the opinions generally prevalent, I might assume 
this  extra demand  as  a  truth  admitted by all 
practical men,  and by  very many  able writers. 
It  is a position, however, of too much moment to 
be thus lightly passed over.  Political economists 
have considered the expenditure of government 
to be derived from a fund that would have been 
equally a source of  demand if it had been left 
in the hands of the public; it becomes, therefore, 
absolutely  necessary  to inquire  a  little  more 
scrupulously, whether  this immense sum is to 
be considered as an additional demand,or merely 
as a transfer of demand. 
Five  hundred  and  nine  millions,  divided 
amongst the  twenty-three  years  of  war,  give 
an average  expenditure  of  about  twenty-two 
millions  per  annum.  Let us  assume,  for  the 
sake of facility of calculation, that the govern- 
ment required twenty millions per annum.  If 
this sum could be raised at once  by taxes out 
of the income of individuals, it would be a mere 
transfer of  income from the people  to the go- 
vernment ;  it would make no difference in the 
expenditure or the consumption.  The ~eople 
would lose the enjoyment which twenty milliotls 
of expenditure might have afforded  them, and 
the  government,  with  its  subordinate  agents, 
would consume an equal value in their stead. 
Considering  that at the present moment  we 
actually raise in  taxes  above fifty millions  per 
annum, it cannot but excite regret that  we should 
ever  have  had  recourse  to so  improvident  a 
system,as funding; entailing upon us a perpetual 
charge from which we  might have been wholly 
exempt, if we had submitted to a greater sacri- 
fice, when the country required a greater exer- 
tion. 
It  must  be remembered, however,  that it is 
by degrees  only  we  have arrived at that state 
of opulence which enables us to raise so large a 
sum within the year, and that at the respective 
periods  when  the  loans  were  contracted,  the 
burthens  might have been  absolutely intolera- 
ble.  To alleviate the pressure of this burthen, 
government has been in the habit of borrowing 
loans from the people, in return for which, an- 
nuities have  been granted to the contributors, 
to be raised  by taxes out of the future income 
of the country.  This has been usually effected 
by  applying to some  banker  or  merchant  of 
great credit, who contracts to  furnish the amount 
by  monthly  instalments,  or  as  the immediate 
wants of government may require. The loan  contractor has not,  ndr  is he sup- 
posed to have,  any such sum ;  but he expects 
by his  own  exertions, and those of his  friends 
who  embark  with  him  in  the contract,  to be 
able to dispose of the annuity in smaller annui- 
ties among the public, so as to provide for each 
successive instalment as it becomes due.  Sup- 
posing then the annuities to be thus parcelled 
out,  it is  clear  that in whatever  manner  the 
contributors had hitherto been employing thei~ 
capital,  they  must  have  made up their  mind 
upon  this occasion  to lay  by  a  certain  por- 
tion in the purchase of an annuity, and to with- 
draw it from active employment.  Instead then 
of distributing that capital amongst their work- 
men,  they transmit it to the loan  contractor, 
who is thus enabled to fulfil his engagement with 
government.  Whilst this process has been going 
on, the orders have been  given for a supply of 
muskets, swords, cannon, gunpowder, kc. ;  and 
upon  the  receipt  of  the  twenty  inillions  of 
money by the government, it is immediately re- 
issued, in payment for the warlike stores which 
the manufacturers have furnished.  When re- 
turned into their hands,  it serves  as a  repay- 
ment for the raw materials,  foocl, clothing, &c., 
and all  the ingredients  of circulating capital, 
which  had been left withor~t  a  demand,  when 
the capitalist who furnished his funds to  govern- 
ment  retired  from  business.  By  this  circula- 
tion, every thing is apparently restored  to its 
former  state ; except that there has  been  an 
extra production  of military 'stores,  and a de- 
ficient production of the goods that would have 
been fabricated by the capitalist, if he had not 
lent his  funds to government;  and the public 
have been burthened with  the payment of an 
annuity of one million, to be levied out of their 
income for ever, and no longer to be  enjoyed 
by  the  producers,  but  to  be  transferred  to 
the annuitants who have now become national 
creditors. 
In examining the links of  this chain, it ap- 
pears, at first view, asif t.he funds for the main- 
tenanceof productive labour had onlypassed into 
other hands, and that the aggregate income of 
the country had not been diminished ;  inasmuch 
as  the taxes levied  to pay  the annuity  have 
added to the income  of  the national  creditor 
precisely the same amount that was taken away 
from the income of the public.  It  seems too, 
as if no destruction of property had taken place, 
save that which arises from the consumption of 
the wrought  goods,  of clothing,  and of food 
fabricated,  or  raised  to meet  the  demand  of 
government.  It  must not be overlooked, how- 
ever,  that when  government,  or its troops, or agents,  obtain  possession  of  the  comtnoiiities 
thus raised  by the exertions of the people, the 
colnmodities are consumed without any .repro- 
duction. 
When the food,  clothing, and raw  material, 
which constitute  the circulating capital of the 
country,  are distributed amongst  the working 
classes,  their consumption is followed by a re- 
production of similar materials, together with a 
surplus  value,  constituting  the ,fund denoini- 
nated revenue or income.  The latter may be 
devoted to unproductive consumption;  without 
in any way injuring the productive powers  of 
the community.  The efforts of the capitalists 
will  be  directed  towards  the  supply of both 
these  funds  with  such articles as are adapted 
to the different  wants  and tastes of  the com- 
munity.  The demand of government will  dis- 
turb the usual course of  production ;  and that 
portion of goods destined to unproductive con- 
sumption  must be augmented beyond what is 
commonly allotted for  the ordinary consump- 
tion  of the society,  by  all  the extra quantity 
now  required  by  government.  If previously 
to this demand the  productive  po\vess of the 
country were exerted to the utmost,  andv  there 
was  no means  of  adding  to the gross annual 
praduce,  then  the government could  only be 
wit11  the commodities it requirecl, at 
the  expense  of  that  fund  which  had  before 
supplied the capitalist. 
If the circulating capital of  the country is 
conceived  to be  represented  by  the  number 
100,  the workmen in  consuming that amount 
ought, at a return of 10 per cent., to reproduce 
a value  equivalent to 110.  In which  case, 10 
would  represent the amount that might be de- 
voted  to  unproductive  consumption,  without 
injuring the society;  and there would  remain 
a value equal to 100, for the purpose of  carry- 
ing on the same process the following year.  If 
government borrows 10 of that 100 in the form 
of a loan, and with that loan stimulates the pro- 
ducers to fabricate a  quantity of commodities 
for  its  own  particular  use;  the value  of  110 
would  be  reproduced  as  before,  but under a 
different  form.  The  .surplus fund  devoted  to 
unproductive  consumption  would  be  repre- 
sented by LW,  and 90 only would remain to sup- 
ply the labourers with  subsistence and raw ma- 
terial  for the following year.  From the con- 
sumption of this quahtity of capital, the work- 
men ought, at the same rate of 10 per cent.,  to 
reproduce in the second year a value of 99 ;  of 
which, if the community consutneci 9, and the 
government as before required 10,  there would 
remain  but the value  of SO  to be  distributed among the working  classes,  in  the third year, 
and so on. 
In this way the capital of the country might 
be  gradually  devoted  tb  consumption.  As 
the  process  continued,  the funds  which  sup- 
plied  the working  class  would  disappear,  and 
nothing but impoverishment  could  ensue.  If 
the  capital  of  the  country  is  always  in the 
fullest  activity,  and  no extra  production  can 
take place in any one  employment of  it, with- 
out a corresponding  diminution of production 
in  some  other;  it  immediately follows,  that 
the demand of government is no addition  to, 
but merely a transfer  of the ordinary demand, 
with this alarming consequence attached, that in 
every step of  the progress,  a certain portion of 
the powers of production is annihilated for ever. 
Let us then bring this theory to the test of ex- 
periment, and trace the effect that would follow 
from the expenditure of  the actual sums which 
government has annually been in the habit  of 
borrowing. 
Assuming then twenty millions to be wanted 
for  the service of  the year, let us suppose that 
this  amount  of  capital  is  taken  from  an  em- 
ployment where  it is reproduced  with a profit, 
and that it is transferred to be expended unpro- 
ductively,  so that  at the  end  of  the  twelve- 
month,  no traces  of it shall  appear.  This is 
precisely  what  is meant by converting capital 
into revenue. 
Now  twenty millions  of  circulating  capital 
thus  borrowed  will,  of  course,  throw  out of 
work all the hands employed by the capitalists 
who  lend  it.  The persons  thus  deprived  of 
employment  would  be  chiefly  artisans,  and 
might,  one with another, earn X40 per annum 
each. At  this rate, the twenty millions of capital 
would give  employment to five  hundred thou- 
sand workmen, and as many of these might be 
heads of families, there could hardly be (taking 
workmen and their families together) less than 
one million of  souls depending for subsistence 
upon their employment.  To prevent the con- 
vulsion  incident to such a diversion of capital, 
let us suppose that government employs a cer- 
tain number as soldiers, and that the remainder 
could find  work  in  manufacturing the warlike 
stbres and  accoutrements,  all of  which  are to 
be  consumed, according  to the conditions, un- 
productively.  In this way,  no  inconvenience 
would be felt; the whole million of souls would 
be  provided  for,  and it would  be a fair repre- 
sentation of the change of productive  capital 
into unproductive revenue. 
Thus far the process goes on very smoothly; 
and were  we  to stop here, no other  difficulty would  ensue,  except  that  which  attends  all 
violent transitions.  But what is to be done the 
second year?  Government requires  a further 
supply  of  twenty  millions,  which  is  to  be 
borrowed  in  the  same  manner,  and with  the 
same  consequences.  Five  hundred  thousand 
more  artisans  are  thrown  out of  work,  who 
with  their  families  constitute a second million 
of persons  wanting the means  of  subsistence, 
in  addition  to the million  of the former year. 
Continuing,  then,  the  same  supposition,  that 
government could apply, as before,  the twenty 
millions  of money in  providing  work  for  the 
discharged  artisans,  we  should  still  have  two 
n~illions  of  persons  to  support  with  a  fund 
equal  only to the supply  of  one  million:  the 
third year mrould  give three millions of people 
to be  enlploycd by a fund  of  the same limited 
power,  and thus  in  succession as long as  the 
war  lasted.  So  that  at the  end  of  the  late 
struggle,  after  twenty-two years of war,  there 
would  be  a  destruction  of  four  liunclred  and 
forty inillions  of  capital,  and  twenty-one  mil- 
lions  of  souls  would  have  been  left  without 
subsistence,  or  any  possibility  of  finding  em- 
ployment. 
A more striking example of  a moral reductio 
ad  absurdurn  could  hardly  be  imagined;  and 
yet, extravagant and preposterous  as this con- 
clusion  may  appear, I am  not  aware  of  any 
exaggeration.  It is,  as  far as I know,  a  f'air 
representation of what would be called destruc- 
tion of  capital, or a diversion of capital from a 
productive  to  an  unproductive  employment. 
'This  view of  the process  may be rendered less 
distinct, by distributing the capital over a great 
extent of country, and a great variety of trades 
and inanuf~ctures  ; but assuming that the ca- 
pital of  the country is always fully  employed, 
and that the expenditure ofgovernment is only a 
transfer of demand, the conclusion at which we 
have  arrived  seems  to  be  inevitable.  Forty 
pounds per annum is assumed as a fair  rate of 
wages, near enough to the truth for the purpose 
of illustration,  and, as  a round number, facili- 
tating calculation ;  if a less sum be taken, the 
evil would be aggravated, and the consequence 
still more absurd. 
Such a state of affairs is not only utterly in- 
conceivable, but; is at absolute variance with all 
our past  experience.  The funds which  gave 
subsistence  to twenty-two  millions  of  people 
cannot  have  disappeared  without  our  being 
aware of  the loss ;  and during a period  when, 
instead of  distress  from want of  employment, 
we have witnessed the greatest activity in every department  of  industry;  every  symptom  of 
increasing  capital,  increasing1 wages,  and  in- 
creasing  popu!ation,  aflording  the  strangest 
evidence of prosperity and wealth.  There must 
either be  some  gross and radical  error  in  the 
theory that leads to such  absurd results,  or in 
making  the application  of  the theory  to the 
actual circumstances of  the country  some ma- 
terial fact must have been overlooked, that has 
either corrected or mitigated the desolation that 
would otherwise have ensued. 
It appeal3 to me  that the error lies in sup- 
posing, first, that the whole capital of the cowc 
try is fully occupied ;  and, secondly, that there 
is immediate  employment for successive  aecu- 
mulations of capital as  it accrues from saving. 
I believe  there are at all  times some portions 
of  capital  devoted to undertakings  that yield 
very slow returns and slender profits, and soinc 
portions lying wholly dormant  in  the form of 
goods, for which there is not sufficient demand. 
I believe,  too, that when capital  accumulates 
rapidly from savings, it  is not always practicable 
to find  new  modes  of  employing it.  Now,  if 
these dormant  portions  and  savings  could be 
transferred into  the hands  of  government  in 
exchange for its annuities, they would become 
sources  of new  demand,  without encroaching 
upon the existing capital.  Unless savings were 
actually accumulating sinlultaneously with the 
expenditure of government,  it appears  to me 
that all the inischief described in the focegoing 
pages would have followed, and that long before 
the expiration of  the contest our efforts  must 
have been completely paralysed. 
edam Smith has long since observed, "  that 
the principle which prompts to save,  is the de- 
sire of bettering our condition ;  a desire which, 
though generally calm and dispassionate, comes 
with  us from  the womb,  and  never  leaves  us 
till we go into the grave.  It  is this effort, pro- 
tected by law,  and allowed by liberty to exert 
itself in the manner that is most advantageous, 
which has maintained the progress of England 
towards  opulence  in  all  former  times.  The 
profusion  of  government  must  undoubtedly 
have  retarded  its  natural  progress  towards 
wealth and improyement ;  but in the midst of 
all the exactions of government, the capital has 
been silently and gradually accumulated by the 
private frugality and good  conduct  of  indivi- 
duals,  by  their  universal,  continual,  and unin- 
terrupted efforts to better their own condition." 
It  will be contended,  no doubt, that if the 
savings had  remained  in the hands of  the ca- 
pitalist, they would have equallybeen a source of demand as when transferred to the government ; 
but this  is  the very point at issue.  It is quite 
clear  tha't  the object  and the consequence  of 
the demand  would  be  totally different  in  the 
two  cases.  Whatever  amount  of  produce  is 
withdrawn from  the market by the demand of 
the saving capitalist, is poured back again, with 
addition, in the goods that he reproduces.  The 
government, on the contrary, takes it away for 
the purpose  of consumption  without  any re- 
production whatever.  The question then  will 
simply be,  What eff'ect  will  be produced  upon 
the general industry of the country and upon 
prices,  according as the one or the other mode 
of employing this extra capital prevails ? 
Now,  whenever  savings  are made  from  re- 
venue,  it  is  clear  that the person  entitled  to 
enjoy the portion saved is satisfied without con- 
suming it.  It proves that tlie industry of the 
country is capable of raising more produce than 
the wants  of  the community require.  If the 
quantity  saved  is  employed as capital  in re- 
producing a value equivalent to itself, together 
with a profit, this new creation, when added to 
the  general fund,  can be  drawn  out by that 
person alone who made the savings ;  that is, by 
the  very  person  who  has  already  shown  his 
disinclination to consume. 
IVl~en  once the division of labour has taken 
place, the efforts of each individual are directed 
to the fabrication  of some specific  commodity. 
He fabricates it in the hopes  that  there  will 
be a demand for all that he .can produce.  If 
every one consumes what he has a right to con- 
sume,  there  must  of  necessity  be  a  market. 
Whoever saves from his  revenue, foregoes this 
right,  and  his  share  remains  undisposed  of. 
Should  this  spirit of  economy be general,  the 
market is necessarily overstocked, and it must 
depencl  upon  the degree in which this surplus 
accumulates,  whether it can find new employ- 
ment as capital.  For it is quite evident, that 
to continue to fabricate the same sort of goods 
that  have  been  already  rejected  would  only 
tend to increase the evii. 
Accordingly, Adam Smith remarks, that "  As 
capitals  increase  in  any  country,  the  profits 
which can be made by employing them neces- 
sarily diminish.  It becomes gradually more and 
more  difficult to find within the country a pro- 
fitable method  of  employing  any new  capital. 
There arises, in consequence, a, competition be- 
tween  different  capitals,  the owner of one en- 
deavouring to get possession  of  that employ- 
ment which is occupied by another.  But upon 
most occasions he can hope to  jostle that other out of  this employment by no other means but 
by deaIing upon more reasonable terms.  Their 
competition  raises  the  wages  of  labour  and 
sinks the profits of stock.'' 
This opinion of  Adam Smith has been  con- 
troverted  by  the  political  economists  of  the 
present  day,  who  have  endeavoured  to show 
that profits  never  permanently  fall  in  conse- 
quence of the competition of capitalists lower- 
ing price by over production.  They admit that 
there may  be a partial glut of  particular  com- 
modities from  miscalculation  of the wants  of 
the market ;  but that over production can never 
induce a general glut, and that profits will  not 
fall from  this  cause,  but will  be regulated by 
the rate of wages, and the rate of wages by the 
quality of the last land taken into cultivation. 
This doctrine, I think, ha  been pushed a little 
too far.  It proceeds upon the assumption tha6 
every addition to capital necessarily creates its 
own  demand;  but in  applying  the theory  to: 
the actual circumstances of mankind, some  in- 
separable conditions appear to me to have been 
overlooked. It takes for granted, that new tastes, 
new wants, and a new population, increase simul- 
taneously with the new capital;  a  supposition 
which is  not consonant with the fact.  The ad- 
vocates of this theory contend that demand and 
are correlative  terms,  and must always 
exactly balance  each other +. That any com- 
modity being in excess proves the efforts of the 
capitalists  to have  been  misdirected,  and that 
there  must  be  a  corresponding  deficiency  in 
other things. 
Nothing can be more clear than that in order 
to make a demand,  you  must have  an equiva 
lent to offer  in exchange.  Something must be 
produced to demand with.  In other words, the 
terms demand and supply merely express, that 
one sort of supply is exchanged against another 
sort of supply.  This is perfectly true as far as 
both  sorts of  supply are wanted  for  consump- 
tion.  If one set of capitalists produce a given 
quantity of  cloth beyond  their own  immediate 
wants,  and another set of  capitalists  produce 
an  equivalent  quantity  of  corn,  also  beyond 
their wants,  the surplus quantity of corn  may 
be  exchanged  against  the surplus quantity of 
cloth,  and thus afford  a  profitable  market  to 
each other.  But this proposition  implies  that 
there is not more corn and cloth in the whole 
than the two classes of capitalists want to con- 
sume.  If  more than that is produced, the sur- 
plus is absolute waste  on both  sides;  and all 
* This argument nas been most ably and adroitly conducted 
by  Mr.  Mill,  in  his  Elements  of  Political  Economy,  and, 
granting that new tastes  and  new wants  spring up with  the 
now capital, appears to me unanswerable. the labour thrown  away.  I shall be asked, no 
doubt, does not this arise from miscalculation 
on the part of the producers?  Undoubtedly it 
does, but it is not an excess of one commodity, 
and a deficiency in another.  It is an excess of 
both.  Why then  were the corn and the cloth 
produced?  For this plain reason :  neither  the 
corn grower, nor the cloth maker, could know 
that there would  be an  excess  till the excess 
occurred.  Each depended upon a market, and 
was  mistaken.  If every  thing could be  fore- 
seen,  mankind  would  not  miscalculate,  and 
there would be no overstocking of the market. 
But they  do miscalculate,  and the market is 
overstocked.  When savings are devoted to re- 
production,  each  manufactures  employs  the 
additional  capital  in  fabricating  that  class  of 
commodities which he has been in the habit of 
making.  But if there was already more  than 
sufficient,  the  addition  mvst  still  hrther  in- 
crease the excess.  How is it possible  for this 
process  to continue  without  a  fall  in  prices, 
and a lower rate of profit to the capitalist? 
The  difficulty  of' finding employment for new 
capital is  acknowledged  by  all practical  men. 
They continually feel  and complain  that every 
channel is full.  The evidence is brought home 
to them,  by the general  accumulation of  com- 
modities undisposed of, and stored in the ware- 
house.  These are the records of so much ca- 
pital  in a sfate of actual stagnation, neither afa 
fording profit to tlie owner, nor employment to 
the workman, and discouraging all future exer- 
tion.  The capital expended in the production 
can be replaced to the n~anufacturer  in no other 
way than by the sale  of the goods;  and until 
that is effected, both capital and workmen are 
reduced to a state of inactivity.  The difliculty 
is easily  got over theoretically,  by supposing 
the manufacturers to Went immediately  new 
articles to gratify tlie tastes of consumers.  The 
practical manufacturer, however, knows the  risk 
attendant upon spekulations of this description, 
and is  afraid  to encounter  them.  But let' a 
new market be opened, and the impulse is given 
at once.  If when  the two  sets of  capitalists 
were producing more corn and cloth than could 
be  consunied, a cbuntry were to be discovered 
which  afforded  other" ohjects  of  gratification 
to man;  and corn  and  cloth  should 'be  arti- 
cles of  request in the new market,  the surplus 
is at once disposed of id ertehadge for the new 
production9 :  a'nd that which wad absolute waste, 
as  corn  and'dt)t%,  becomes  in another form s 
source of enjoyment,  and a stimulus to future 
exertion.  SO will  it  be  with  savings.  Open 
but a new market, or invent new objects of de- 
sire,  and either the  savings  are .consumed in another fam  by the persons who had previously 
ceased  to consume,  or  they  are advanced  as 
capital  to workmen,  and  the revenue  arising 
from that capital is  expended in the purchase 
of the new luxurieg. 
Now this is precisely what is effected by the 
increased  expenditure  of  government :  a new 
and imm+?nse  market  is  at once  opened  for 
consumption. 
The immedia~e  means of  purchasing  which 
government possesses is  derived from the sale 
of annuities.  The power  of  levying taxes in 
perpetuity,  and  of  transferring  the  income 
arising  therefrom  to individuals,  enables  &e 
government to collect all those savings that find 
no immediate  employment  as  capital,  and  to 
devote them to expenditure.  The purchasers 
of these  annuities  consist clhiefly of the class 
living upon fixed monied incomes, who are dis- 
inclined personally to employ their petty savings 
in business,  ad  who prefer the security of go- 
vernment to that of private bomowers ;  or they 
are of  the class of  capitalists, who%nding the 
returns upon  their  capital  inadequate  to the 
trouble atld risk, are glad to receive a stipulated 
and certain  return  as interest, rather ,thm an 
uncertain  one  in  the form' oFfscantj #ofits. 
Tbe purchase d  an annuity is a complete proof 
that the owner of the capital has not the means 
of employing it advantageously. 
The  loan contractors thus become the channel 
through which  all the accumulations of  capital 
that are feebly employed,  or that are without 
employment,  find their way into the hands  of 
government ;  whence  they  immediately  pass 
into a state of  complete activity amongst the 
producers  who  furnish  the  warlike  stores,  or 
such  other  commodities  as  the  subordinate 
agents of  government require.  Whether  this 
additional consumption be eventually beneficial 
to  the country,  is  not  the present  object of 
inquiry ; but there  cannot  be  a doubt,  that 
during its continuance, the effect must be pre- 
cisely &he reverse  of  what  we  have  been  en. 
deavouring to trace during the progress of rapid 
accumulation  of  capital.  Its tendency would 
be, to  relieve all capitalists from excess of-stock; 
to create a  demang for  their goods, whilst  it 
diminished the competition  of  new capitalists, 
and thus ta increase both prices and profits. 
That this  increase  of  profits  has  been  the 
consequence of a war demand, we  have all the 
evidence that historical evidence can afford. 
No proposition  is  more generally admitted, 
than that the market  rate of interest paid for 
the loan of capital is proportionate to the profits 
that can be  made  from the employment of it. If profits,  then, were regulated solely by those 
made upon the last  quality of  land taken into 
cultivation, we should observe in all countries 
a regular fall in the market rate of  interest as 
the population increased, and was coinpelled ta 
have recourse to inferior land.  Now it is not 
denied that such has  been the usual course of 
the rate of  interest;  but it is  equally certain 
that there are very remarkable deviations from 
this law, and for long periods of time together. 
In the twenty-six years of peace that fbllowed 
the treaty of Utrecht, the market rate of interest 
ran  steadily  at 3  per  cent.,  and 3  per  cent. 
stock of government, previously to the war ,of 
1739, sold as high  as 107 *.  During the war, 
the 3 per cents. fell from 107 to 80, and after 
the peace of Aix la Chapelle, again rose to 106. 
In the year 1762, during the seven years  war, 
they fell to 63, and rose  during the peace .to 
between 80 and 90.  In 1788, during the Ame- 
rican  war,  they fell  as low as 54,  and in  the 
following peace  again  rose  to 96t.  During 
the French revolutionary war,  the market rate 
of interest rose to 7, S, 0, and even 10 per cent., 
* Hamilton, p. 3  1 7. 
.t.  Hamilton, on the National Debt, p. 3 17,3 18.-I  am well 
aware that the price of government securities is not a perfectly 
correct criterion of the market rate of interest, but it affords a 
fair  approximation,  and a  scale  of  compariron  for  different 
periods. 
dthough d~lring  the whole  time  lands  of  the 
verylowest quality were inclosed and cultivated. 
Since the termination of the war,  the interest 
of  money has again fallen, and  the Bank  are 
discounting at 4 per cent. 
These facts  are  in direct opposition  to the 
theory of profits being regdated nl7vays by tfle 
quality of the last land taken into cultivation*; 
they are 'a strong confirmation  of  the  opiniori 
of Adam Smith, that the profits  of  ctipital  are 
subject to variation, from the proportion wliich 
the capitals bear to the existing population, and 
to  the desires or powers of the  community to  con- 
sume.  The fact, too, of the low rate of interest 
paid in  the  year 1792 is strong evidence, that 
previously to the breaking out  of theFrench war, 
capital was accumulating faster than the means 
of  ' employing it ;  and warrants me in the  as- 
sumption, that savings from revenue were then 
going on, *hich  might  afford  a  fund  for  the 
war expenditure of government. 
If,  then, during the periods  of peace, when, 
probably,  there  is  a  rapid  accumulation  of 
capital, I find that profits  diminish;  and that 
during periods  of war there is a great increase 
* This point has been  very ably urged  by Mr. Malthus in 
hia Principles of Political Economy, and has not as yet received 
any satisfactory answer. of  profit,  and that  both  these  results  ensue 
without  reference  to the  quality  of  the  land 
taken last into cultivation, how can I resist the 
conclusion,  that  savings from  revenue,  when 
devoted to further production, have a tendency 
to increase the quantity of commodities beyond 
the means of consumption, and thereby to  lower 
prices. 
When savings from revenue, instead of being 
devoted  to reproduetion,  are transferred into 
the  hands  of  government,  no productive  la- 
bourers are thrown out of employment, for the 
savings have  never yet served as capital ;  the 
working  classes are still fully occupied by the 
capital  previously  existing,  it1  providing  the 
gross annual produce for consumption.  When 
government  comes  into the  market  with  the 
finds supplied by the loan contractors, it makes 
a  demand  upon  the  producers  for  an extra 
quantity of work, to be furnished by the same 
number of workmen ;  wages rise, but the master 
manufacturers, with the  certainty of a market for 
their goods, gladly advance the extra stimulus. 
The whole industry of the nation is called into 
action, and new life infused into every employ- 
ment. 
That capital exists in a dormant state, and is 
capable of being called into increased activity  by 
the application of the proper stimulus, there can- 
notbe thesmallestc2oubt.  Every  day's experience 
&ffords  practical evidence of it.  No sooner is a 
market, or supposed market, opened at Buenos 
Ayres,  or  elsewhere,  than  cargoes  to an im- 
mense  amount are shipped to take advantage 
of  it.  The trade with  India is thrown  open, 
and  instantly  the  different  presidencies  are 
glutted  with English goods, without any dimi- 
nution in the supply of the home market.  Ask 
the manufacturers  at Leeds, Manchester, Bir- 
mingham, what would be the effect of a certain 
sale for fifty millions of their respective manu- 
factures?  Can there be a moment's  hesitation 
that every workman would  be called  upon  for 
his  utmost  exertion.  In the  evidence before 
the committee on  the Agricultural Distresses, 
Mr.  Attwood  states  the productive  power  of 
Birmingham  to  be  double  what  its  action 
then was.  Examine the evidence of Alderman 
Rothwell,  Mr.  ltous,  and  various  other  wit- 
nesses, who all agree, that. during the war there 
was both greater production, and greater con- 
sumption.  How could  there be  greater  pro- 
duction  from  the same number  of  workmen, 
without more exertion, and higher wages? The 
hay season, and the harvest  season, offer  good 
illustrations of the quantity of  extra work that 
can be done, under the sti~nulus  of high wages. 
Every one knows what exertions are sometimes made  when  artisans  are  paid  by  the  piece, 
Machinery  may  be  made  to work  the whole 
twenty-four hours instead of twelve.  Nothing 
is wanting to create this activity but high prices, 
and the confidence of a market*. 
If savings are to be employed as capital, they 
must be  distributed amongst a population not 
more numerolls  than before, and higher wages 
must be given ;  but, I contend, that there will 
be a disinclination to give the higher wages, or 
to employ workmen  at any wages,  when  the 
goods  produced  have  to seek  for  a  doubtful 
consumption by competition in a market already 
fully supplied.  When the savings are expended 
bygovernment,the manufacturers  feel  themarliet 
* The following  information  was  obtained  from  an  in- 
telligent .rvoollen manufacturer in the neighbourhood of  Leeds. 
He  occupies a large mill,  and has the necessary prdportion  of 
manual labour  for  thc power  of  his  engine.  He was  very 
much pressed for the kind  of  goods he manufact~wes,  and in 
order to meet  the increased demand,  cdled on  his labourers 
for their utmost exertions.  The ordinary  day's  work  is from 
six o'clock  in the morning to six in the evening, allowing time 
for meals.  He  overworked his hands from two to three hours 
per day, thereby making from seven to seven and a half days 
work per week for each hand ;  and although for a few months 
in summer under such circumstances, he is ~f opinion that an 
increase  of  fth  in production  might be obtained in his  mill; 
yet to continue to extract  as  much  as possible  from manual 
labour for any considerable length of time, would not produce 
an increase of more than one-seventh. 
to  be declared and manifest, the demand urgent, 
and the customer prodigal andimprovident in  his 
bargains.  Itis  to be remembered also, that the 
demand of  government is  not only for goods, 
but for men.  The  army and the navy must be 
recruited.  Whilst  more  commodities  are  re- 
quired,  government  withdraws  a  part  of  the 
power that is to produce them, and wages are 
still  more enlianced  by this  new competition. 
The natural consequence that results from this 
increased activity is,  a very great extra demand 
for agricultliral praduce, and for sustenance of 
every desc~iption.  That part of the loqn which 
is  distributed  in pay  to the troops  is mostly 
expended in provisions for  their maintenance. 
Probably a greater quantity may be consumed by 
them as soldiers, than if they continued in their 
usual accupation ;  and t.his is much dwelt upon 
by some writers, as the great cause of extra con- 
sumption during war; but, I think, more import- 
ance has been attached to this species of waste 
than can be justly ascribed to it.  Ttie demand, 
howqver, of a large manufacturing population, 
receiving high instead of low wages,  in  full 
empdoyment; ia  an  efficienb and powerf~I.~cause, 
that  must  produce  ad immediate  effeot  upon 
consumption,  more  especially of food  and the 
raw materials of coarse clothing. 
The numbers in the higher classes of society bear no sort of proportion to that of the work- 
ing class.  We are apt to dwell  up011 the ex- 
penditure  of  the former,  as if their  revenues 
were the great source of national demand ;  for- 
getting that the bulk  of the gross annual pro- 
duce is  consulned by workmen  whilst prepar- 
ing  commodities  to gratify  the  tastes  of  ca- 
pitalists.  A  return  of  10 per  cent.  has  been 
thought a fair profit to the possessor of  capital. 
For every 2100, then, of circulating capital that 
is distributed amongst workmen as wages, which 
is the measure  of their consumption, the pos- 
sessor  himself  can consume but to the extent 
of &lo. 
If,  in  consequence  of  brisk  markets,  the 
artisans are employed fourteen hours a day in- 
stead of twelve, and they receive wages in pro- 
portion, the demand for goods suited  to their 
consumption will be increased in the same ratio 
as the wages.  An increased exertion amount- 
ing to one-sixth would be tantamount to an in- 
crease of population to the same extent ;  and a 
population,  too,  possessing  the  means of  ef- 
fective demand. 
It has been said, that the "  desire of food in 
every man is limited by the narrow capacity of 
the human stomach."  I am satisfied, however, 
that the consumption of  a labouring man and 
his family, when  in the receipt  of  high wages, 
admits of considerable latitude;  and that one 
can hardly form a definite idea of the increase 
of denland for agricultural produce, for coarse 
goods,  and the  homely luxuries  of  the poor, 
that might be created by a manufacturing  po- 
pulation suddenly enjoying a  great augmenta- 
tion of revenue from full employment. 
When more work  is performed, more wages 
must  be  given  to  the  labourer.  If  the  in- 
creased wages are exactly proportioned to the 
increased quantity of work, his rate of payment 
remains the same, although the actual amount 
he receives is greater.  An artisan, working six 
days,  at twelve  hours  per day,  and rkceiving 
18s. for his  weekly wages,  would,  by working 
fourteen hours,  be entitled to 21s.  per  week. 
In  this case, without altering the rate of wages, 
his demand on the market would he incre--?d 
one-sixth. 
The'same may be observed in regard to pro- 
fits.  when the  capitalist  furnishes  an extra 
quantity of goods, he acquires a greater amount 
of profits, but not a greater rate of profits.  If, 
however,  in  consequence  of  a  great  demand 
from unproductive consumers, and the difficulty 
of obtaining the extra produce to meet it, he 
can obtain higher prices for the work done than 
the extra cost of production from higher wages would  entitle  liinl  to ; he  woultf  receive  not 
only more profits, but a higher rate of profits. 
There callnot be  a doubt that during the war 
more produce was raised, and more work done. 
This would be a source of  greater  pcafits  and 
greate~  wages,  even  witho~it  any alteration in 
the rate ofteither, and would create an increased 
demand in the markets.  But it does appear to 
me, that not only was there an  increased amount 
of wages  and profits fiom the extra work done, 
but also an increased rate of both, and that this 
was effected through the medium of prices. 
With a greater demand for work,  and a part 
of  the workmen  withdrawn  for  the army and 
navy, I cannot conceive it possible that the rate 
of wages  should  not  be enhanced by the com- 
petition.  If one hundred  pieces of cloth were 
required instead of fifty,  not only  more looms 
would be employed, but more wauld be paid by 
the piece  to the weaver.  I am, therefore, dis- 
posed  to concur  with  Mr.  Malthus,  that  the 
rise of  wages which took  place during the war 
did actually afford a greater remuneration to the 
labourers. 
Whatever doubt there may be on this point, 
there can be none respecting the rate of profits. 
For the market rate of interest rose to 6, 8, 10, 
arid  even  12  per cent.  at some  periods  of  the 
war;  and I would ask, howlit is possible to ac- 
count for this rise in the sum paid for the use 
of  capital,  unless  a  greater  profit  was  to be 
derived from its employment. 
The depreciation of  money,  suppositlg it to 
exist, could in no way  affect  the interest ;paid 
for its use.  If $200  of currency became of no 
more value than $100,  ten pounds paid  as in- 
terest for the $200 would be of no more value 
than five pounds.  Whatever affected the value 
of the principal, would equally affect  the value 
of the interest.  Whatever affected the value of 
the capital,  would  equally  affect the value  of 
the profits.  It  could  not  alter  the  ratio be- 
tween the two.  Some other cause then, besides 
depreciation,  must have  raised  the rate of in- 
terest, which is the index of the rate of profits. 
It has been contended, that the rise of wages, 
if general, would diminish profits, but not raise 
prices,  and that if it did raise  them,  no pro. 
ducer would  be  benefited;  because  he would 
lose  as  much  upon  all  that  he bought, as  he 
gained upon that which he sold.  But this rea- 
soning is  not  applicable  to a state of sbciety 
in  which  a  large  class  are  ncit  producers. 
If A, having a  certain  capital, 'and employing 
a certain number  of labourers  in raising corn, 
has  to  exchange  his  produce  with  By  who, with a similar capital  and number of workmen, 
is fabricating cloth,  it is  evident  that no ad- 
vantage could accrue  to either of  them by in- 
creasing  the price at which they interchanged 
the corn and the chth.  But if both A and B 
have to contribute a fixed sum for tile expenses 
of government, for the payment of public cre- 
ditors, for the interest on capital borrowed, for 
the support of the clergy,  it is their ioterest to 
interchange commodities at the highest  prices 
that can be obtained.  Wherever tbwe exists a 
large class  living  upon  fixed  incomes  derived 
out of  the.  produce. raised  by  the industrious 
classes,  the sum  tbat is levied  upon  the pro- 
ducers  beoamw . virtually  diminished  in . pro- 
portion  rrs  fhe vices of: commodities  ara in- 
creased.  Thus a new distribution of the annual 
produce takes place.  More 4han tlw just,  dare 
is obtained by-the  producers at the experase of 
that pcwthni, wkh.of  ~iglht  belongs t9 the class 
who are only consumers 
In times af peace  when  more is, produced 
than  finds, a  ready  oonsumptisn,  there  is  a 
difficulty in  -caisivg prices  a3 w,ages rise. ,, But 
in .time of war,  when  there is an uaqwd de- 
mand, when  the markets are more scantily sup- 
plied in proportionto the extent~f  consump$ion, 
when  the suppIy,egp  only be  obtained by in- 
creas'ed exertion on  the part of the capitalists 
and the labourers,  then it is that the working 
classes reap their harvest, and acquire not only 
the increased  wages and profits  to which they 
are  entitled  from  the addition  to thecannual 
produce, which their extra exertion has created, 
but an increased rate both of wages and profits. 
It is an  acknowledged fact, that the money 
value  of wages  rose  during the war,  and tbe 
market rate of interest proves that the rate of 
profits also rose.  Now, how could the capitalist, 
having more to pay to his workmen, realize even 
the same rate. of profits,  except from  an  ad- 
vance in the money price of commodities? 
A  given  nnmber  of workmen,<  and a given 
number of capitali3ts emplaying them, we called 
upon  to furnish. dtr  e'st~a~quantity~  oftwork,  Is 
it possiblei  tdcondtive that they will not take 
advantgge  of:  the 'urgent  nm~ssibies  af the 
buyer, even if-they could produce &be  a~tides 
wanted  without  additiotlals sacrifices3  But, if 
the men  are to  .work  thirteen hours a day in- 
stead  d1Melve,  l+and  the  mohinely- is -to  ,be 
watched night. afid da~+,,.and  t;he employ-  to 
devote more tlme'to !iaprintendence, am they 
not  entitled -to  ' d 'gpeater remuneration ?  The 
sacrifice  OP 'pCtSbna1  cemfoi-t  is gfeaber;  and 
must be paid %r,  or the commodity will not be 
produced, In the  comparison  of  these  two  modes  of 
employing the savings from  revenue,  we  have 
taken f;or granted that thelbavings devoted  to 
capital  would  still  remain  within the country. 
Now  ithis is gtanting more than the facts will 
justify.  When  the  capital  accmulates  ra- 
pidly,  and profits  fall, it will have a  tendency 
to remove  to: Spain,  to  Naples,  to Columbia. 
It ;will be engaged m the carrying trade, or in 
employments that do not  set  much  labour  in 
motion 5  in all which  cases but little 'stimulus 
will be given to the home producer.  When the 
savings are employed  as lbans  to the govern- 
ment,  the~~demand  finds  its way immediately 
into  kha market, and either relieves it by taking 
off the  $produce  that remains on hand, or stimu- 
lateatto the produotion af more. 
During the progrees.of the waT,  five hsndred 
and nine ~illibns~  sterling were in this way de- 
voted to the purchase of commodities intended 
for corr-sumption, instead of being devoted  to 
reproductior~.  And +Iiask  whether it bb neces- 
sacy ito  reaorrt, to depeeiation, -inp  mdct  to  J ac- 
count for  the high prices which such a market 
fm:uo~urnption  >must$  have ooasioned ?  It  is 
to be observed, too, that  though in. th.e  &st  in- 
stanoe tkge demnti might  belfrstilthe  materials 
of  war, it would  gradually extend to almost 
every comtnodity ordinarily consumed by man. 
When  once the loan  is  in the hands of go- 
verntnent, it  is  distcibute~l  . in a tllousand  dif- 
ferent channele.  When  paid  to  the troops, it 
passes into the market for provision, fw neces- 
sariesj and for clothing ;  when to the Admiralty, 
part of it is  applied  to the purchase of hemp, 
tar,  tallow,  timber,  and part  for  provisions  of 
every kind for victualling  the navy:  when  to 
the Ordnance, it is expended in accoutrements 
of all descriptions : when  to the Civil Depart- 
ments of the State, it would  form  a  source of 
demand in the same manner  as  the income of 
private  families.  Whatever  direction  the  ex- 
penditure  took, it would be a call upon the ca- 
pitalists  to exert  themselves,  and to produce 
the commodities wanted for consumptian,  The 
war had scarcely commenced before its effects 
were ,wade manifest.  Nothing more was want- 
ing @. stimulate the industry  of  the country 
than a new  market,  where  the <producer was 
certain  of  a  sale for  his  pods.  It not  only 
afforded a source of extra profit to all the ca- 
pital then in existence, but affered the strongest 
temptation for the accumdation of more.  Tbre 
cannot be  a  more  decisive  proof  of this than 
the immediate  change in the rate of interest. 
If  sucl  a  demand  had arisen  at ance,  no in- 
genuity in the  application  of'  the  powers  of 
machinery,  and  no  increased  exertion of the physical powers of the industrious classes, co111d 
have provided the means of meeting it.  But it 
was diffused  through  twenty-two years of war, 
in the very mode  most  likely  to produce  the 
effects we  have witnessed.  In the commence- 
ment the extent of our operatiot~s  was not upon 
the scale they assumed towards the conclusion 
of  the contest; during the last four years  of' 
which,  the expenditure  of government,  inde- 
pendently  of  the  supplies  raised  by  the pro- 
perty,  and other war  taxes, was  not less than 
a 1111ndred  and forty-seven millions sterling. 
This increase of expenditure, therefore, dame 
upon  the country when it was  more  prepared 
to meet  it.  For,  although  five  hundred  and 
nine  millions  sterling  was  the  amount tlistri- 
buted  amongst  the working  capitalists of  the 
country, the value received  by govetnment in 
return would be charged with the extra profits 
of those capitalists, and the extra wages of their 
workmen.  These  profits  and  wages  would, 
therefore, form  a part of the increase made to 
the generzl income of  the country,  and be  an 
additional fund to contribute to  the enjoyments 
OF the people,  if destined to consumption ;  or, 
if not so consumed, would offer a further source 
for the accumulation of capital. 
When cominodities beconle high priced,  and 
continue  so  for a  lengtl~  of time,  it is  some- 
times argued that this circumstance of itself is 
proof of a depreciation of the currency.  1 have 
no other objection to this phraseology, if it be 
adhered to, than that its tendency 
is to mislead.  Commodities are higher priced, 
and tl~erefore money is no longer able  to pur- 
chase the same quantity as before.  Be  it so : 
but let us understand each other.  Let us not 
wander so far from common sense as to affirm, 
that the altered value of money is the cause of 
the high prices, instead of  the effect.  Let us 
not invalidate the fixed contracts between man 
and man ;  aad when commodities fall back from 
high prices to their level, be allowed to resist 
the stipulated payment under the pretence that 
the  inoney3has  altered  in value,  and not the 
goods.  Well might Locke say; "  Words being 
intended for signs d'ideas to  make them known 
to okhess,  not by any natur~l  signification, but 
by  a  voluntary  imposition ; it  is  plain  cheat 
and abuse when I make them stand sometimes 
for  one thing and sometimes fer another,  the 
wilful doing whereof can be  imputed to nothing 
but great folly, or great dishonesty." 
If every increase of  price is to be designated 
as a depreciation  of  money,  let us  revise  our 
language ;  and when a bad season, or difficulty 
of production, or taxation, has raised the price of corn,  of cloth,  of leather,  and  of any other 
article that we  consume ;  let us say that corn, 
cloth,  and  leatller  have  not  risen,  but  that 
money has  fallen  in  value  fiorn  depreciation. 
If  the object be to confound all our conceptions, 
and  all  our reasonings  on  this  subject,  there 
cannot be any more certain mode of cffectr~ating 
the purpose than by adopting this equivocating 
language. 
There is great difficulty, I admit, in defining 
what  is  meant  by  currency remaining  at its 
level ;  but supposing the quantity of circulating 
medium to be at any period whatever in its due 
proportion  to commodities, I sliould say it re- 
mained at its level, if its iscrease or diminution 
corresponded exactly with the increase or dimi- 
nution of the value of com~ndities  to be circu- 
lated by it; that is to say, if the circulation of 
commodities of four hundred millions required 
a currency of forty millions, and that  this pro- 
portion  of  one-tenth  was  the due level,  esti- 
mating both currency and conlmodities in gold ; 
then,  if the value of commodities to be circu- 
lated ipcreased  to four  hundred  and fifty  mil- 
lions,  from  natural causes inctependent  of  de- 
preciation, I should  say the currency, in order 
to continue  at its level,  must  be increased to 
forty-five  millions;  or  that the forty millions 
must be made to circulate with such increased 
rapidity, by banking or other improvements, as 
to perform the functions of forty-five millions. 
If,  then, more business was done, more com- 
modities  produced,  more  interchanges  made, 
and those interchanges made at higher prices, 
more circulating medium would be required, or 
a greater rapidity of circulation.  Such an aug- 
mentation, or such rapidity would  be  the con- 
sequence, and not the cause, of the increase of 
prices.  Accordingly,  we find  on  examination 
of the evidence before  the committee  on  the 
agricultural distresses, that as far as any increase 
or diminution  of the circulating  medium  can 
be connected with prices, such was the order of 
precedence. 
There is scarcely a shade of diflerence in any 
of the evidences' respkcting the time when the 
advance in  prices began.  It 'does not corre- 
spond  with the increased  issues  of the Bank, 
nor with. the high price of gold  bullion,  wl~ich 
latter decthindeed did not even show itself till 
the  yew  1800;  whereas  the  prices  paid  by 
Greemich  ,Hospital, as given in the Appendix 
to the Report,on  .the Resumption of Cash Pay- 
ments, denote an increase before the year 1797; 
notwithstanding the remarkable  contraction of 
the currency, both of the country banks, and the 
Bank  of England, during the years  1795 and 1796.  Prices,  too,  began to fall  immediately 
after  the termination  of  the war.  Although 
the Bank  issues were,  upon  an average,  con- 
stantly increasing  from  the year  1813 to the 
year 18  19 ;  and since that period, and since the 
resumption of cash payments, there really does 
not  appear to have been any material diminu- 
tion of the circulating medium,  as far at least 
as the issues of the Rank of England form any 
criterion by which to  judge of the amount ;  in- 
asmuch as the quantity of coin and bank notes 
together form a larger amount than when Mr. 
Peel's bill passed into a law. 
It seems  to be generally admitted,  indeed, 
that since the year 1813, there has been a con- 
siderable dimiilution  of  country  bank  paper ; 
but here again we  must take care not to con- 
found  the  cause  and the  effect;  for,  as Mr. 
Malthus observes, "  it is of the utmost impprt- 
ance to recollect,  that at the end of the war 
prices failed, before the contraction of currency 
began.  It was,  in fact,  the failure  of prices 
which destroyed the country banks, and showed 
us the frail foundations on which the excess of 
our paper currency rested *." 
I have no intention of pushing this argument 
farther  than it will  fairly bear,  but it is quite 
* I may be allowed to quote the fact, without admitting the 
implied inference of an excess. 
clear,  that  with  no  other criterion for  depre- 
ciation than a rise in prices, and with a demon- 
stration that a rise of prices must have been in- 
duced from  natural causes,  such as increased 
taxation,  increased  wages  of  labour,  and in- 
creat.ed demand for consumption, in proportion 
to the means of  supply, we shall be venturing 
to  sea  without  helm  or compass if  we  suffer 
o~~rselves  to guess what part ofthe increase has 
been  owing to depreciation,  and what  part to 
the natural causes just referred to. 
It  is of no avail to argue, that such a state of 
things could not have existed  if the Bank had 
been paying in specie.  Of that I adinit  there 
can scarcely be a doubt ;  but in what way would 
the increase of price have been prevented?  By 
a contraction of the circulating medium, that 
would have reduced prices below their natural 
level ;  would  really have  altered  the value  of 
currency,  and have given  it an  unusual  ele- 
vation.  The foreign  expenditure and adverse 
exchange  must  necessarily  have  i'orced  the 
Bank  to reduce the amount  of its paper,  and 
the prices  at 1vhic11  commodities ~vould  have 
settled  wot~ld  i!ave  been  soille  iritermediate 
point  between  tlie high  prices  occasioned  by 
the influence of tlie nrnr, anct the low prices oc- 
casioned  by  the  contraction.  Prices  acted 
upon  by these opposite  causes might have va- ried,  as  either the one  or  the other predomi- 
nated, or have remained nearly stationary. 
The Bank restriction  has,  in fact,  unfolded 
what would have been the consequence if the 
act of 1797  had  never passed.  The currency 
must have  been  reduced, until it was raised to 
a par with gold ;  I have no hesitation in saying, 
such  ought  to  have  been  the consequences. 
The community  having  established  gold  for 
their  standard,  should  never  have  departed 
fiom it.  But I think it by no means improba- 
ble, that  with  the immense and continued ex- 
penditure that has occurred, the fluctuation of 
the currency, without a restriction, might have 
been  very  considerable;  and,  that  in  conse- 
quence of that measure, its level may in reality 
have been less disturbed. 
It would be  idle to affirm,  that during the 
period  of the restriction act, the currency had 
been so nicely  adjusted by the Bank directors, 
as never to exceed or fa11 short of the due pro- 
portion it ought to  bear to the value of commo- 
dities ;  it is probable, that in the course of the 
period. they have erred sometimes on one side, 
and sometimes on the other.  But it is evident, 
that in assuming  the price of gold as the mea- 
sure  by which  to  estimate  the deviations  of 
currency from its level, we should be adopting 
a criterion that wou!d  afford  but little insight 
into the real  fluctuations  of  an  inconvertible 
currency, and would expose us to every degree 
of exaggeration. 
It  may  be thought, perhaps, that with these 
views,  I consider the Rank restrictioll to have 
been practically beneficial:  I am glad  to have 
this opportunity of entering my protest against 
any such inference.  The measure  appears  to 
me  to have been fraught with extreme danger 
to  the  public;  to have  occasioned  a  consi- 
derable  loss to the government, entailed addi- 
tional  taxation  on  the  subject,  and  to have 
been  attended  with great injustice  to all  cre- 
ditors.  Most  dangerous;  inasmuch as  it was 
giving to the Bank  directors  a.  power  of con- 
trolling the circulating medium of the country, 
which was liable to the greatest abuse.  Most 
impolitic;  because  the  loans  required  by  go- 
vernment would  have  been  less, in exact pro- 
portion to the increased value of the currency, 
if it had been allowed  to contract, as of neces- 
sity it must have done without a restriction on 
specie  payments.  The whole  debt  incurred 
would  consequently  have  been  less,  and  the 
future  taxation diminished in the same  ratio. 
It has interfered, too,  with  all  contracts  be- 
tween  debtor and creditor; for as the creditor 
is subject to the fluctuations that occur in the 
value of gold,  and must submit to receive, in liquidation  of  his  claim,  the  same  nominal 
amount,  whatever  be the  diminution  in  the 
value of the metal itself, he is justly entitled to 
receive the same nominal amount of' gold, when 
any accidental circumstances occur to raise its 
value. 
I  therefore  hail  the  measure  of  resuming 
cash  payments  as  one  of  the greatest boons 
that could  be  conferred;  and,  more  particu- 
larly, as it took place at a time when  from  the 
progress  already made in the fall of the price 
of gold, any contraction in the amount of  the 
currency was rendered unnecessary. 
In settling the rights of debtor and creditor, 
it is of great importance to determine, clearly, 
what were the actual changes that took place 
in the value  of  our money;  such  a  question 
never could have arisen, but for the restriction 
of  specie payments,  and is  another proof,  if 
more  were  wanting,  to show  the mischief  of 
tampering with  the  currency of the country. 
At the present moment, there is a strong  feeling 
against the claim of the public  creditor.  It  is 
contended,  that the debt was  contracted in a 
depreciated  currency,  and the  dividends  are 
henceforward  to be paid  in an  undepreciated 
currency.  Now  granting,  in the first  place, 
this supposition to be true, if the contract were 
made  between  the  creditor  and  the  pubsc, 
under an express provision that lie was to have, 
a specific dividend, and that that dividend was 
to  be  paid  in  the  legitimate  currency;  and 
farther,  that during the whole  period  of  bor- 
rowing, there was a law in force, that the divi- 
dends  should  be  paid  in  specie  within  six 
months after the conclusion of the war,  there is 
no pretence whatever for flying from the terms, 
even  if  they were  to become more oppressive 
than they really  are.  But if the currency has 
not been depreciated, if  the value  of gold has 
arisen  from  the  accidental  cause  of  a  large 
foreign  expenditure,  and on  the  cessation  of 
that expenditure  has  returned to its original 
level ;  then the public debt was contracted in 
money  of  the  same value  as it is at present, 
and there is no pretence  in law or equity that 
we should  relieve  ourselves fi-om paying what 
is justly  due.  The very  raising  of this  ob- 
jection  to the'  claims  of  the public  creditor 
demonstrates unequivocally that it is no longer 
a dispute upon terms, or whether this meaning 
or  that  shall  be  attached  to the word  depre- 
ciation;  but whether the rights of'a large class 
of  individuals are,  or are not, to be violated. 
We  have  already  done  them  one  wrong,  in 
passing  an  act  that  prevented  the currency 
from  rising;  and instead  of  giving  them  any 
redress,  there  is  a  strong  feeling  to  coinmit a  second wrong  under  the  pretence that not 
rising has the same signification as falling. 
I ha\;  r:ow  brought to a  conclusion the ob- 
servations I propdsed to make on natibnal ex- 
penditure, and its effects on currency and pro- 
duce.  No person cab reflect upon the points that 
have  been  discussed  in  the forgoing  pages, 
without anticipating the few remarks that re- 
main to be made on the causes of our past and 
present  difficulties.  It appears to me,  that in 
whatever degree minor circumstances may have 
co-operated,  the great and mighty  source of 
the distresses felt by  all  classes  of producers 
has  been the transition that took place  at the 
termination  of  the war.  Not  the  transition 
from  war to peace,  in  the usual  acceptation 
of those terms;  not  the transition  that  arises 
from the diversion of capital from one employ- 
ment to another employment ;  not the transi- 
tion from  the waste  occasioned  by  the extra 
consumption of troops, either at home  or  en- 
gaged  in  actual  warfare;  but  the  transition 
from  an immense, unremitting, protracted,  ef- 
fectual  demand,  for  almost  every  article  of 
consumption, to a comparative cessatidntof that 
demand.  And this change,  too,  accompanied 
with almost every circumstance that could ag- 
grava%e  the evil.  For  the producers had been 
so  long  habituated  to  the extraordinary  call 
made upon them  by the increased expenditure 
of so many millions, that tlleio means of supply 
has been formed with a reference to the system 
and an expectation of its contiauance. 
Hence,  no  sooner  had  the  large  profits 
which their  exertions  enabled them  to obtain 
exceeded  their  immediate  wants,  than  they 
began  to multiply  the  sources of production. 
The savings  from  these  increased  profits,  as 
soon as realized, were vested  in new  and more 
powerful  machinery,  or  improvements  of  the 
old.  There  appeared  to be no  limits  to the 
extension  of these powers, yet,  were they kept 
in  full  and  active  employment.  Machinery, 
which  under  ordinary  circumstances  always 
throws out of employment the greater part of 
those  who  had  been  supported  by  the circu- 
lating  capital  before  it became fixed,  seemed 
to be deprived of  its temporary noxious effect 
upon  the condition of  the labourer;  for  the 
rate of  wages never  fell from the high level it 
reached soon  after the  commencement  of the 
war,  and proved  that  the increased  demand 
would  admit  of  no  relaxation,  and still  out- 
sttipped the ordinary rate of production. 
The excitement  was  not confined  to manu- 
-factures.  It extended to the producers of the 
raw material  in every branch of employment: the mines of copper, tin, lead, iron, coals, were 
all in activity. 
The  farmers frelt the immediate influence of 
the demand, in ia  still  greater degree than  the 
manufacturers : food  and raw  material  were 
in great request, bul they had riot the power of 
resorting  to machinery,  Whatever  could  be 
effected  by  drainage and permanent improve- 
ments, 'by  manure ahd dressing, and what has 
been called  high  farming,  was  done ;  but the 
produce  from  the  old  landb  could  not  keep 
pace with the demands of government, and of 
manufacturers  of  all  descriptions  in full  em- 
ployment,  The  price of  corn, therefore,  rose 
mare  in proportion  than  that 'of  any  other 
artide. 
Notwithstanding  that  me thousand  seven 
hundred and ninety-eigtit! i~losure  bills passed 
the  House  of  Commons,  during the  twenty 
years  between  I795  ad  1815,  giving  an 
average  of  eighty-eight  for  each  year,  the 
supply" bas still"foi~nd  .to  be inadequate ;  and 
forgign  countries  were  nut  In  requisition  to 
wkq  good, the, &,fki~y-  '1 he resources  of 
our machinery  were~,braught,4n~to  action  not 
only t6 furnish commodities for our own imme- 
diate  co~slimption.  but  to  supplv  a  surplus 
quantitj  to be  exported  in  return  for  corn. 
They  enabled  us  to  search  every  quarter  of 
the globe to procure the means  of' subsistence, 
and to obtain the effective ingredients  of  cir- 
culating capital, by the impartation offood and 
raw  material  from  every  country  within  the 
circuit of commercial intercourse. 
In  the midst ofthis excitement, and with all 
the powers  physical and  inoral in full action, 
the war ceases, and with it the demand of go- 
vernment  and its  subordinate  agents.  What 
other  result could follow than distress throughout 
every employment in which productive capital 
was engaged?  The reservoir intended to  supply 
the national  consumption was  filled as before, 
but the great mains that were to carry off  this 
supply were stopped.  Every market overflowed 
with commodities, and gave no encouragement 
for further production*. 
There cannot perhaps be a more striking con- 
* It has been said that the increase of  revenue is of itself 
sufficient proof that there  is no falling ofli in demand and con- 
sumption.  I n-ould  merely observe  in reply, that when  once 
the demand has so far  diminished  as to cause produce to sell 
at what  may  be  called a  glut price,  the same  consumption, 
or even  an increased consumption,  hay t&ke place,  and'ltdd 
very considerably to the revenue, without affording any benefit 
to the producers;  the consumption then goee on  at their ex- 
pense,  and  without repaying to them the costs of  production. 
The cheapness  ot  tooct,  too,  would  enable the lower  classes, 
who are the chiet  consumers,  to expend a larger  amount in 
beer and spirits, snuK, tobacco, and other excisable articles. firmation  of  the opinion  here  enforced  than 
the change that has taken place with regard to 
the. importatinn of corn.  At the time of pass- 
ing the Corn  Bill,  it was  universally believed 
that we  did not grow enough for our own con- 
surqption.  The promoters and opposers of the 
bill  were  alike impressed  with  the  idea,  and 
they  acted  upon  this  impression.  The pro- 
moters expected that the price must necessarily 
be sustained at SOs..  and the opposers tliought 
it never could be less.  Both parties were borne 
out in their conclusions by  the necessity  of a 
constant  iwportation;  and I  have  no  doubt 
that such necessity tlien  actually existed.  No 
sooner, however, did the war cease, and with it 
the great expenditure of government, than the 
discovery was  studdelzly made that we did  grow 
enough  for  our  own  consumption.  Can  any 
body conceive this change to have arisen from 
the mere  cessation  of' the wasteful  consuinp- 
tion of war?  Can any body believe  that from 
that moment we should have had a succession of 
abundant harvests ?  Is it not clear that the great 
superfluity of all ~roduce  was the effect of the 
diminished demand 2  First, the diminu ti011  of 
the actual ciernand ot government  itself in  the 
corn market, and, secondly, the  ditninution of de- 
mand from all the subordinate agents, and from 
the manufacturers and their workmen, to whom 
the expenditure of government had  given  full 
employment.  It  seems probable that the effect 
of  this  demand  was felt through all corntries 
from which we imported corn ;  for we find sirni- 
lar complaints  of  glut and low  prices' ht the 
same  period  in  almost every part of  Europe, 
Canada,  and the United  States.  This might 
arise partly from the cessation of  our own de- 
mand, and partly from the cessation of demand 
whicll  the  war  expenditure of  other  govern- 
ments had created 
The universalitv of this distress is  not to be 
accounted for on any othe~  alrpposition, and can 
hardly be attributed  to abundant  harvests for 
so  many  years  together,  in  ali  the  different 
quarters  of  the  globe.  More  especially  as 
there does not appear to be any conclusive evi- 
dence  of  such abundance,  except what  is in- 
ferred from  the  lowness of' prlce.  Moreover, 
the low  prices are not confined to corn alone. 
It is  well  known  that manufactures  are less 
in quantity,  and less in price  also.  A  simul- 
taneous  fall  of  price  takes  place  in  almost 
every commodity, and in  almost all  countries. 
It cannot  be abnndant harvests ;  for it affects 
articles  with  which  harvests  have  no  con- 
nexion.  It cannot be  alteration  in  the  cur- 
rency;  for  it is felt  in  those countries where Ibo  change in  the currency lias  taken  place*. 
To  what  then  can  we  attribute this  universal 
effect,+  but to the  general  diminution  of  de- 
mand ?  There still remains the capital, and the 
labourers, and the commodities, but no longer 
the same market for consumption. 
To  those  who imagine consumption  not to 
be a necessary ingredient of  demand, and that 
in order to >make  a market for commodities, it 
is only neoessary to produce more, these pheno- 
mena offer problems not very easy of  solution ; 
nor is  tke difficulty less for those who conceive 
the previously  existing  capital  to have  been 
diminished  by  being  cotlverted  into revenue. 
According1y;everydrowning t!~eorist  has caught 
at the various straws that crossed him.  It  was 
the preparation for cash payments, or the  raising 
the value of the carrency 2~5  or $0  per  cent., 
or adopting gold as a standard, instead of silver, 
or the :importation of corn, or tlie blessings of 
* A 'genfl&mah'  froin Piedmont informs me,  that the  same 
measure of corn raised upon his own estate, al~ich  during the 
war sqlq at,,9 fraws,, now sells at 8, ahd hw done SO ever since 
the pegce, Jtho~gh,~qurjw  tb  fide  period, the circulating 
medium  of  Pi~dlnont  has  consisted  of  coined  money  in  its 
most perfect  state.  A let+-- ..-..  flto~rn  to me, written  by a 
merehadt  In  Hollahd to h~s  wrr.--ndent  here, stating that 
the rent of  bad about Utrecht had' sunk to one-third of  its 
former amount owing to the great fall in prices. 
a good  harvest, or taxation, or the want of re-. 
form in  parliament,  or  any thing but the ob- 
vious cause,  that the supply was  too great for 
the demand. 
I would put this single question.  Was there 
ever -an instance  of  a per~jza~zently  low  price, 
that is, a price which would not remunerate the 
producer,  except fronl  the supply  continuing 
too great for thc demand?  Why then are we 
to bnsp  oursclvcs  in finding out remedies  for 
an evil which, if left to itself,  nus st always work 
its  own  cure? The producer  has the remedy 
in  his  own  Iiands.  No  man  will  continue to 
carry on a business that is attencled  with loss, 
or even with less than tlie ordi11al.y profit of ca- 
pital.  If  thc capital is generally redundant, from 
tlie  falling  off  of  consumption,  the  capitalist 
n~ust  submit to receive a lower  rate of  profit, 
until new markets, or the growth of' new tastes, 
and  new  sources  of  enjoyment,  offer  further 
motives  for  increasing  einployment  and  con- 
sumption. 
The distress that has pervaded  all classes of 
producers,  since  the  termination  of  the war, 
has been greater perhaps than ever was  known 
before.  The manufacturers are said to be re- 
covering ;  and it inay be so : but I suspect the 
masters  can only find a market by selling their 
goods at a lrerp  low rate ofprofit, and tllc artisans can only find employment by working at a low 
rate of wages. 
The state of  the agriculturist is calam~tous 
beyond  all forruer example; and  the extent of 
capital embarked in this pursuit, together kith 
the extent of country  over which  it is  distri- 
buted,  brings  it home  to every man's  feelings. 
One cannot contemplate  a situation more diq- 
tressing than that of an industrious and honest 
class of the community embarking their capital 
in a pursuit which for vears  ha^ been attended 
with the greatest possible encouragement, and, 
without any fault or negligence  on  their part. 
suddenly finding their  commodities  without  a 
market, and themselves reduced to comparative 
poverty. 
It  is a hard doctrine to preach to men in this 
situation, that their only remedy is to produce 
less.  They naturally ask, Will this restore our 
capital ?  How are we  to recover what we have 
invested in the permanent improvement 01. the 
land, if we are to  give up its cultivation?  IVho 
is to begin ?  Will not every one endeavnur to 
obtain  the greatest  possible produce?  I have 
no wish  to bruise  the broken  reed,  but I fear 
there  is but  one answer  to these  melancholy 
cluestions.  Those  who  are  the  least  able to 
bear the pressure,  must  be  the first to submit 
to the hard terms of necessity.  It is the lot of 
all who embark their capitals in any enterprise, 
to take the risk of its success or failure.  Such 
distressing fluctuations are continually  occur- 
ring in  trade,  from  circunis~ances  over which 
the parties have had  no control.  At one time 
the West  India planters  were  reduced  to the 
verge  of  ruin,  and  many  have  sutfered  most 
severely.  They are sucering now n~rhans  more 
than any other class, yet w~thout  exciting much 
commiseration.  Sonlerimes the Baltic trade is 
distressed ;  ~uen  the Canads trade ;  or that in 
silk  or  tore~gn  wool.  Instances  of  this kind 
might  be  $,t"---.l  without end.  But it never 
has beela,  or  can  be  esnected, that the parlia- 
ment  or  tne public can  guarantee individuals 
from  the  uncerta~nty  incident  to  all  human 
speculations.  Nor  can  they, with any justice, 
be called upon  to  make  goocf  the loss inrhich 
different interests have suffered, or may sucer. 
The farmers,  as  a 'boi?y, merit  every  con- 
sideration ;  and tlothing sliodd be left untried 
that  is'  likely to  afford  assistance,  or  palliate 
their  mhfortunes.  But let us  beware  of  the 
empificd ' ~~ostr~s  that  hrk  ~ffeied  in  such 
profusSon, by the kotintfy $endetaen assembled 
at  our  county  mm&4ii'gs.  Let 'us b'eware  of 
holdifig ant tbe prosbckfbf relid, 'By  loans or 
purchases of tornby  bdernrne~t  ;'or increasing the currency, with a view to raise prices.  Such 
remedies,  if they were practicable,  which they 
are not,  would  never  ream  tr:e  seat  of  the 
disorder.  The farmers are sutrering rrom over- 
production.  They are  not  proclu~lr~g  more, 
perhaps,  than  at the  time of  the high-prices; 
but  the  great  demand  has  ceased,  and  the 
same quantity becomes  relatively  an  excess. 
Nothing,  therefore, can be attended with  more 
fatal consequences, than to adopt any measure 
which by leading thein to continue the produc- 
tion, will only perpetuate the disease. 
For  above  twenty  years  they  have  had  a 
golden harvest, and many have gathered largely 
into  their  garners.  But they  have  not  been 
prepared  for, nor did they foresee tile  sad  re- 
verse;  and they find themselves suddenly, by 
the  fa11  of  prices,  and  the lessened  va111e of 
their stock, bereft of half their capitals. 
I do not apprehend, however, that the change 
will  have the effect  of  throwing any great ex- 
tent of land  out of cultivation.  The lessened 
production  will principally arise from a11  aban- 
donment of what has been called high farming. 
This will  have  a  two-fold  operation:  the ex- 
penses  01  cu~tlvat1on  will  be  diminished.  and 
there will be less procluce rrom the -me  extent 
of' land.  Such lessened produce will be soId at 
higher prices ;  and this appears to me to be the 
natural and the only remedy. 
The inevitable  consequence of  this remedy 
must be  a general fall  in  the nominal amount 
of  the  whole  landed  rental of  the  kingdom. 
This appears  to be  a  momentous  result,  but 
will  not  eventually be attended with  so much 
pressure  as  is  commonly  imagined.  I  have 
examined this silhject with some care, and have 
come to the conclusion,  that taking  past  and 
present trlnes together, the class of landholders 
have not much reason to complain.  In  expressing 
thererore  my opinion  on  the state of the agri- 
cultunsts, I must confine  my commiseration to 
the farmer alone,  whose  interests I consider to 
be essentially different  from  that of the land- 
lord, although for a particular purpose it has of 
late  been  found  politic  to represent  them as 
the same. 
There is so much difference of opinion in the 
evidence  of  the land-agents  examined  before 
the  committee  on  the agricultural  distresses, 
that it would  be  unwise  to place  implicit re- 
liance on  any one.  It may be safely assumed, 
however,  that in the course of the last thirty 
years, the rental of the landed proprietors has, at 
least, doubled;  and taklng this fact along with 
daily  experience as  to  tnelr  mode  of  living, theve  can  ha~dly  be  a doubt, that during the 
whole peribd OE the  arduous struggle in which 
we'bbe  ken engaged, they have scarcely suf- 
feed at  sing1e:privation;  whilst the receiver of 
afhmidal  income was actually sinking under the 
Pf&h~3  bf increasing taxation, and increasing 
p~ieea  ;  the landed proprietor was enabled with 
every rise of price to augment his rental propor- 
tionally, and to  indulge in all the enjoyment that 
a constantly improving income could afford. 
During the whole  period  of the war, specu- 
lations were entered into with borrowed money, 
dnder a full persuasioa that land could scarcely 
bt! bought too dear *.  No price,  however  ex- 
travagant,  but what  was  found  to repay  the 
sph~latm  by  the increasing  rent;  and  now 
v~hea  the accident that gave rise  to this artir 
&ialSvalue has ceased to  operate, and prices are 
returning to  their level, the landholder, glfaEting 
his  dppl-ication on  distresses  which  more  im- 
mediately relate to the farmer,  appeals to the 
legislature  for  protection,  as if the acdder~tal 
high 3alw  was to be guaranteed to hini by the 
state. 
* I belie*  that the great clamour respecting agricultural 
&tresaee  has arisen  chiefly from  the ruin that hu  attended 
theae speculations. 
I do not mean  to deny that there are many 
landholders  who are at this moment suffering 
from the fa11  of  rents,  and from  farms  being 
thrown  upon  their  hands;  but  I  do  con, 
tend that their sufferings are attributable b a 
great measure to their own want of foresight. 
Without  any merit  or exertion  on their part, 
they were supplied with the means of providing 
against any reverse that might  occur :  if,  in- 
stead  of  that,  they  preferred  present  enjoy- 
ment, they must take the sweet and the bitter 
together:  but can  hardly be  allowed to allege 
their former  good  fortune  as  the  groud of 
relief,  to be obtained  at the  expense  Qf  the 
other classes of the community. 
It  is  universally  admitted,  that  even  now, 
farms are let at higher rents than in the year 
1792;  but the increase  of  taxation,  and  the 
pressure  of the national debt, are dwelt upon 
as  more  than counterbalancing the advantage. 
Does not the observation  imply, that up to the 
time  of  the fall  of  rents,  the landholder bad 
escaped  fiom the  increasing pressure  of  tax* 
ation?  Why is  the  possessor  of  landed  pra- 
perty to be exempt from  paying  his  share  of 
the public burthen ?  Have not  all  annuitants 
and receivers of a nominal income been paying 
these increasing taxes during the whole period of  the war,  without  any  means of  relieving 
themselves ? 
In the midst of all the present oomplaints of 
injustice and distress, there is not, I firinly be- 
lieve, a single landholder in the kingdom that 
would  fairly  change places with  a  fundholder 
of 1792 ;  that is to say,  if his  estate were  to 
be sold at thirty years purchase upon the rental 
elf 1792, and vested in  the funds at the then 
price of the day.  I believe that no landholder 
would consent to give the present vdue of his 
estate, and the rents that he bas received since 
1792,  for  the  amount  of  the stock  it wwld 
then have purchased, together with all the divi- 
dends since that time. 
It  requires  more  than  ordinary patience to 
examine,  with  temper, the various  sophistl-ies 
that have been resorted to, in order to uphold 
the  system  of  high  prices  and high rents.  I 
shall not enter into the arguments that occu- 
pied the public attention during the passing of 
the Corn Bill;  but no man  in his  senses  has 
ever doubted,  that the object of  the bill  was 
to keep up the price of corn, and to afford what 
was called a remuneration to the grower. 
That measure has entirely failed, because we 
have ceased for the present to be an importing 
nation.  The great object which the advocates 
of that  measure  professed  to have  in  view  is 
attained.  We  do  now  grow  enough  for  our 
own consumption.  Still it is affirmed, that the 
grower has  not  a  remunerating price.  What 
is to be done?  Higher protecting duties would 
be  bf  no avail:  The farmers have already the 
monopoly of the home market.  The phraseo- 
logy has therefore taken a new turn ; as prices 
ctdnnot be kept up, they must be rendered  re- 
munerating,  by  diminishing  the  expenses  of 
cultivation ;  and as  taxation  is  alleged to be 
one  great source of  this  expense,  the farmers 
are  to  be  relieved  by  diminishing  taxation. 
Was  it  not  the general  cry of  all the  land- 
holders, that we could not meet the competition 
of foreign corn, because taxation had so raised 
prices, that it was impossible to cultivate upon 
the  same  terms  as  the foreigner ?  Be  it so. 
What is this but admitting that taxation does 
raise prices?  And without such admission, can 
any  one doubt  the fact?  Must  it  not  then 
raise the price of corn as well as of every other 
manufacture ?  With all this taxation upon its 
cultivation, corn has settled to its present price. 
If there  had  been  no  taxation,  would  it not 
have  settled  to a  still  lower  price,  and have 
left as little for remuneration as before ?  There 
is no escaping from the horns of this dilemma. I have  looked"tni%ugn  ttrt! eW&ee  of  the 
wittless~s  " &armfl'eilil 'before  rile cbmmittee  on 
the  agnculturat' di&resses,  \h;it% the ~iew  of 
ascerta~n~~~g  wnat part oi  the expenses of  ~111- 
t1vaflOt-i arrse lrclnl  taxatiorl ;  and'tcle ~esult  is 
not' oallfi'etrnous and amusing,  but shows 'how 
lifde ralance is to be placed upon the estimates 
of  men,  wnose  minds are strongly biassed  in 
favour oi'~ome  specla1 measure.  It  was the ok- 
ject of dost of these witnesses to represent the 
expenses  of  cultivation  as  high  as  possible. 
In their  statements,  which  were  professedly 
derived  from  practical  experience,  they  were 
at liberty  to rate  the  expenses  of  manuring, 
wear  and tear,  and various  other  items, at a 
vague estimate :  but the taxes were capable of 
exact  calculation, being  a  certain  amount  on 
their windows and farm horses.  The result is, 
that:  In magnifying the  gross  amount withsnt 
the power of magnifying the actual taxes, tney 
have left the proportion  which  the direct tax- 
ation bears to the whole expense of cultivation 
so  exceedingly  small,  as scarcely to produce 
any perceptible effect either upon prices or ex- 
penses.  Taking the  average  of  Mr.  Ellman, 
jun.,  Mr. Ilott,  and Mr. Edmonds, the present 
direct taxation, now that the horse tax is abo- 
lished,  does  not  amount  to more  than ,+,th 
of  the  expense of  cultivatian,  or  about nine 
shillings of tax in every lOOL of gross expense*. 
The  landholders complain too of tithes and 
poor  rates,  as taxes that fall  partially on. the 
land, and from which  the other  +classes  of. the 
community-  are  exempt.  It  ie  perfectly  well 
known,  that  no partial tax  can ultimately fall 
upm a producer.  Are there not partial taxes 
laid upon  almost every branch of  industry? If 
the brewer were to complain, that he could not 
cmtinue his  business  on account  of the tax 
upon  beer,  would  not  the landholder be  one 
of the first to tell hiin, that the tax was repaid 
to him in the higher  price charged to the con- 
sumer?  Take the tax upon salt, the highest in 
psoportion  to the value  of the article, and in 
that  sense  the inost partial  that can  be  con- 
ceived :--Is  any one simnl~  enough to imagine, 
that  this  tax  falls  upon the preparer  of salt? 
How then does it happen, that the farmer alone 
is an exception to the general rule, and has not 
*' See Mr. Ellman's  Evidence, pp. 112 and 1 13. 
Direct tases  -  -  32  16  0 
Gross expense -  -  379  0  0 is &;-,th. 
Mr. Ilott's Evidence, p.  140.  Direct taxes 6d. on a gross 
expense of  61.  175. is ,iTt.h. 
Mr. Edmond's Evidence, p.  184. 
Grossexpense  -  A's988  0  0 
Direct taxes  -  9  4  0 is ,;,th. the means of  rspaying Ik6mselfi fkr aag partial 
tax thatl  may be hid1  tipod  his @uddb&r 
Smefimes  dh4!  ttithes  are, ~epre&hted  4s  a 
chargb,upn the ladlard, and  as  n dduction 
fmm  a dent.  Nm  I would  ask, 1 did  wer.uny 
man pv  the same price for an estatk chargeable 
with Whes, that ,he would  give for an equally 
productive estate ,tithe free? Does it nbt bm 
a part of  his calc~lation  when he estimates the 
rent,  and the number  7f  years pmcb-aw %hat 
he  means  to give? And if  he buy  a1  estate 
subject to tithes,  does he not  make a prorpor- 
tionate deduction ?  In truth, he buys the right 
to aila~tefiths  af  the produce,  the remaining 
tenth mver has belonged to  him.  Xt  is qukk a 
different hqoestion, whether tithes be an eligible 
mode  of providing for the  clergy ;  but such being 
the law, the clergy have as good a title to their 
po&ian as the  poprietor has to the remainder. 
In  paint of fact, the clergy scarcely ever receive 
their full right.  Tithes, therefore, as now col- 
lected, are.practically a benefit to the landlord, 
inmuch as he obtains a part of  that portion 
which belongs to  the church ;  and for which, at 
the time of purchasing the land, he never paid. 
There  is  a  very  effectual  remedy,  however, 
against the burthen of tithes, both as it affects 
the landlord and the farmer ;  although, I admit 
its prwticd  appii~atiw  lwwld be attended with 
some -dScdty,  Latlthe land be -divided be- 
tween  landlord. RD~  the  ~1eqyooa.n ac- 
coding tadheir respective ,rights,  ad  each 
might,, let  his  portion, titheaee.  :.But  (how 
mauy landlwds, evea iQ  those eases whme the 
relpedy  was  practicable,  wotzld.aeoede tn  this 
equitable &vi$ion 2 
The poar-rates are not exactly upoa th  same 
footmg  with  the tithe, because,  when  estates 
were purchased,  there was  no foreseeing  the 
height  to  vhich  they  would  rise.  It  could 
not, therefme,  form a definite item in the cal- 
eulakion ;  but even in this case, all e&a&es gur- 
chased  since  the  establishanent  of por-rates 
have been  subject to  the. contingenay,  and  a 
lms price paid in consequence.  The poor-rates 
have,  in  fact,  increased to their peseat enor- 
mous amount,  in a  great meam  hhmugh the 
contrivance of the landholders aad the tenants, 
who have  upon  all occasions  endeavoured  to 
keep down  the wages of labour,  by  paying  a 
portion  of them out of the poor-rates.  63~  this 
way,  they  have  been  used  as  the  means  of 
making  the  proprietors  of  houses  contribute 
towards the payment  of the farmer's  labourer. 
If  the poor-rates had been less, the  wages of agri- 
cultural labour must have been higher.  It  has 
been urged, too, on the part of the land-owners, that they have not only their own agricultural 
poor  t6 suppt;  bbt thet  manufactaring paor 
also.  That the gi.eat@r  part of the p~bY*rat@.  is 
paid by  the imd, there-  be no doubt ;  bht it 
is equrlfy true,:thpltx very large amount is paid 
by the  tld-;  itk~ld  falls Qpon  houses and manu- 
facturing capitttl*.  The  charge  against  the 
manufa@um-ers 6f not supporting the whole df 
their  awnl @or  bas: some foundation;,  but it 
must  remembered,  that the landowners have 
derived  the greatest possible  advantage from 
the augmented numbers of the manufactwers, 
who have affmded the principal market for their 
produce~~and  must bet considered as the origifial 
source of  their wealth.  The steam-engine has 
done (more for  agriculture than  any  bounty 
thatlever-was o%~ed  4  and. I kdve little doubt, 
if the d~bjsot  'clasely followed  up, that ehe 
greab ok~adge  which  took  pfacs when we were 
converted from a  fiation exporting corn to one 
requiring its  importation  might  be  traced to 
the perfetimg of that ~tupdous  instrument of' 
manufaceurifig power. 
* The  reati+l.  of knds is. estimated  bv Mr. L~we  at fortv- 
five  milliow,  and  that  of houses at. fiixteen millions.-State 
of England,  by Joseph Lowe,  Esq. p. 66.  This publication 
exhibits" a  Vatlety  of Tacts  and tables,  collected  apparently 
with great care dad  indusky j  ahd  IS  a. valuable contribution 
to our stock of statistical knowledge. 
When  any .partidar..produce  comes  into 
competition  with  that,  of  Esreigs  ceuntries, 
then,-undoubtedly it becomes a qtlestiod, what 
sacrifices  the government will make to encou- 
rage ar protect  the home growth, or.  thehome 
manufacture.  And if the partial  ta=lthst bas 
been  levied  has  so  raised  the price  th,at the 
cammodity will no longer bear the competition, 
it may be and often has been found advisable, 
to impose  a  countervailing  duty  on  the im- 
ported corresponding articles. 
Taking then this principle for a  basis, what 
ought to be  the  countervailing  duty  on im- 
p~;ted corn4 so as to balance the partial tax of 
tithe and poor-rates. 
.The evidenw before the committee<   on  the 
corn  laws, and the agricultwt distresses, fur- 
ilklkes  the data for  this  calculation, . On  re- 
ferring  to the table,  published  by  tk  Lords' 
committee on the  Corn Laws  in 1813, I find, 
that op.@n  average taken from forty$turo oaun- 
ties, ,the  tithe  and  paor-rates,  and dl  other 
rates,  are  together  less  than  half  the  rent. 
Upon land of  twenty  shillings  rent,  the tithe 
and rates would  be  alwtllt fiine shillings.  Mr. 
Elfman  states,  that the proauce  or  wheat on 
lam ot tnis value is tnree quarters  per acre; 
consequently,  this  would  give  three  shillings per quarter as  the countervailing  duty to ba- 
lance the tithe and poor rates. 
As land, however,  does  ~IUL  produce .wheat 
above once in fofotir years, some allowance must 
be madelfoEoP:  the  bwer value of the other crops, 
which, when estimated correctly, gives an aver- 
age pdduce sf wheat  per  acre  of  abotlt one 
quarter afid .a  half, and therefore 6s.  pel quarter 
for the countervailing duty#.  Such would be 
the claim to  which the farmer would be entitled, 
in order to  protect his corn from fore~gn  com- 
petition,  as far as regards the direct  taxes  of 
tithe and poor-rate. 
In respect to the indirect'taxes, inasmach as 
*  Mr. Ellman's  calculation  of three auarters per acre  on 
land of  209. seems  ratner too  h~gh;  tak~ng  me prouuLt: at 
twenty bushels per acre, the countervailing  dnty dl1  stiR be 
less than 7s. per quarter.  Mr. Ilott gives the following crops 
as  the produce of  land paying 253, per acre rent,  and about 
12s. tithe and rates. 
E. 8.  d. 
Turnips, per acre  .  -  .  200 
Barley, four quarters pcl  acre, aL  14.9.  .  4  16  0 
Clover, one ton and a quarter, per acre  .  3  (1  0 
Wheat,  twenty bushels at 7s. per acre  .  7  0  0 
Gm  produce of four yeam  .  .  -  16  0 
Average produce per annum  .  .  1  4  0 
which estimated  in wheat at  7s.  per  bushel,  gives an average 
wheat  produce per annum  of  twelve  bushels per  acre;  tke 
tithe and rates are therefors  1s. per bushel,  or 85. per quarter. 
they  are  incapable  of'  being  calculated,  and 
filrther, that all other articles are alike  subject 
to them.  no ma~luGctures  could be sent out to 
pav for  thc corn  that had  not  been  liable to 
these indirect  taxes in the  course  of their fa- 
bric~tion. Xow,  as the  corn  imported must 
pay fbr the maiiufactures sent out in exchange, 
the inlportecl corn is thus, in fjct, subjected to 
all the inciirect  taxes that are levied  upon the 
home corn ", besides  the additional charges of 
freight and insurance upon so bulky an article, 
which finm Dantzic to Idondon  does not amount 
to 1css ~i~ail  IVS. 6d. per quarter. 
It  has  been  necessary  to  dwell  somewhat 
longer  upon  this  point,  because  we  have 
heard such extravagant opinions respecting the 
aniqunt of duty necessary to protect the home 
grower.  lf  we are to  keep up a scale of artificial 
prices that shall remunerate the cultivation of 
* As the indirect taxation  bears  more  heavily on produce 
raised  by circulating  capital or human  labour  than on  that 
fabricated  by fixed  capital or by machinery,  it is a  question 
open to discussion,  how far agricultural  pl-oduce is or  is  not 
more affected  than  manufactures?  I  am  inclined  to think, 
that the quantity of  human labour employed in raising  corn 
bears a larger  proportion to the amount of  fixed capital than 
it does in manufactures ;  and that on this principle the agri- 
culturist might fairly claim  some additional protection.  But 
the point  is doubtful,  and could  not  be  ascertained  without 
very minute and precise investigation. our most  barren  soils, there is  no limit  to the 
amount  of  duty that must  be  imposed;  but 
there is a limit to the sacrifice which those who 
are to pay the duty will  submit to.  The great 
difficulty of the present moment is, to prevent 
our capital from flying to other countries whcre 
corn  is  cheap,  and the wages  of  labour  low. 
Infinitely more  danger,  as  it strikes  me,  is  to 
be apprehended from the flight of  capital, than 
from  the  risk  of having  our  sl~pply  of  food 
interrupted, supposing we were to depend more 
than at present on corn of foreign growth. 
The  whole  question  of  the degree  of pro- 
tection to be given to the landed interest rests 
upon  this  point.  The  most  sanguine  agri- 
culturist  would  think  it absolute  madness  to 
encourage  the cultivation  of  Bagshot  Heath. 
Where to draw the line, and to what  degree 
the country shall submit to the disadvantage of 
wasting  its  capital  and productive  powers  on 
barren  land  must  be left  to the discretion  of 
the legislature.  ln  deciding, however, it would 
be well to remember, that tlrere  is at present a 
strong tendency  to remove  capital to foreign 
countries, and that personal property is already 
subjected to a very severe pressure in the form 
of  legacy duty, from  whieh  the landowner  is 
entirely exempt.  On every succession to per- 
sonal property, even to that of  a ~arent,  1 per 
cent. legacy duty is paid, and for more remote 
relations from 3 to 10 per cent.  By inquiry at 
the Stamp Office, I find that these duties are, 
upon  the average,  very  nearly  3  per  cent.*; 
and the average duty upon probates and letters 
of  administration  is  about  B  per  cat, more, 
making @gether nearly 5 per  cent.  This tax 
is levied upon the  *amount of cupital, and is re- 
peated  at every succession.  Now it has been 
ascertained,  that  where  property  passes  in a 
direct line fram father  to son, there will  be  a 
succes&on  about  once  in  thirty  years;  and 
where  callatera1 descent is included, the suc- 
cession takes place about once in twenty years. 
As the succession to property by will,  in this 
country, not only includes collateral relations, 
but absolute strangers, the succession might be 
still more rapid ;  let us assume it, however, to 
take place once in twenty years i.; then 5 per 
cent. upon capital  once in twenty years,  is the 
same  as 5 per cent.  upon  the income of  that 
capital  every year,  and the  legacy  duty and 
probate are, in  fact, equivalent  to a perpetual 
income  tax  of 5 pex  cent.  upon  all  personal 
* The average duty is 21. 18s. 3d. per cent. 
Many copyholds are  held upon payment  of  a fino at the 
death of the tenant.  The value of  these fines is calculated, at 
the insurance offices, up011  the basis that  there will be  a suc- 
ce:sion  once in  twenty years;  and the fact is found to  corre- 
spond with the calculation. property. If  any one possessing land should be 
disposed to underrate  the pressure of this tax, 
I beg him to consider what his feelings would 
be,  if  upon  every  succession  by  death  one 
twentieth  of  his  estate  should  pass  into the 
hands of government. 
The expenditure of government has been so 
intimately connected with  the changes in the 
value of property, that I could not conclude my 
observations, without  taking a short review  of 
the relative situations of persons enjoying landed 
property,  and  those  possessing  personal  pro- 
perty.  A spirit  has  of  late manifested itself, 
which I can hardly designate by any less quali- 
fied  term  than  that of  fraudulent,  but which 
has been awed and checked by the strong feel- 
ing of integrity that  still  pervades  the great 
bulk of society.  Opinions have been delivered 
on the necessity  of  breaking  faith  with  the 
public  creditor,  which,  twenty  years  ago,  no 
man of character would ever have  ventured to 
hazard, and to which  no audience of  English 
gentlemen  would  have  listened  without  in- 
dignation.  Paley defines the law of honour to 
be a system of rules, calculated to facilitate the 
intercourse  of  gentlemen  with  one  another; 
and he adds, "  That injuries done to tradesmen 
by insolvency, or delay of payment, with num- 
berless exa~npIes  of the same kind, are accounted 
no breaches of honour;  because a man is not t 
less agreeable  companion  for these vices,  nor 
the worse to deal with in those concerns which 
are usually  transacted between  one gentleman 
and another."  I trust  it is not  reserved for 
some future moralist to adduce the instance of 
a breach of national faith, as one  of  those  de- 
partures from common  honesty which  is sanc- 
tioned by the law of honour.  Great allowance 
may be  made for  the soreness  that men  feel 
when thebrilliant prospects of increasing wealth 
fade before  them; but it never can justify  an 
attempt  to relieve  tllemselves by the sacrifice 
of the general interests of'  society. 
If the positions I have endeavoured to esta- 
blish be correct, the possessor of personal pro- 
perty has derived no nlore advantage try the re- 
turn of prices to their former level than he was 
justly  entitled to;  and  the  landholder,  after 
twenty years of increased enjoyment, still finds 
his situation better than it was in the year 1792. 
Of those who, near the conclusion of the war, 
changed their property from the funds to land, 
or from land to the funds, probably neither the 
one  nor  the other  foresaw  the  consequences, 
and they have experienced very opposite turns 
of  fortune.  With  their  speculations and  the 
result of them, the pixblic have no concern. 
During the war the profits of farming capital have been  far  above  the general average, and 
the great demand for agricultural produce kept 
the prices at so  high  a level,  that inany were 
tempted to invest their property in the purchase 
of land, and many to embark in its cultivation. 
At  the present moment there is a great pressure 
upon the agricultural interest.  But I have no 
doubt  when  production  shall  have  gradually 
accommodated  itself  to consumption, the diffi- 
culties  will disappear, and the land, as heretofore, 
afford a due remuneration to those who will esti- 
mate their stock fairly at the present prices.  In 
the course of the last six or seven years, farming 
capital  has  sunk  to nearly half its value, and 
this loss must be  submitted to.  If the owner 
expects that the present produce is to yield the 
usual rate of  profit  upon the former estimate, 
it can only end in disappointment. 
But it is unnecessary to pursue  this  subject 
further, and I shall take my leave, by recapitu- 
lating,  as  briefly  as  possible,  the  conclusions 
which  the  preceding  investigation  tends  to 
establish. 
It appears  to  me,  that  the  expenditure of 
government, through  its various  channels  and 
subordinate  agents,  has  occasioned  a  demand 
for almost every species of produce.  That the 
supply required to meet this demand could only 
be obtained by the increased activity of the ca- 
pitalists and working classes.  That the savings 
of the community, when  borrowed  by govern- 
ment  in  the form  of  loans,  became the fund 
which, being distributed amongst the capitalists 
and their  workmen,  stimulated  them  to  this 
extra  exertion.  That  the  markets  were  re- 
lieved  from  all  superfluity in  consequence  of 
the demand for consuinption exceeding the or- 
dinary  supply.  That  in  consequence  thereof 
prices began to rise  at the corninencement of 
the war,  previously  to the restricticm on cash- 
payments, even cluring a period of considerable 
contraction  of currency.  That lv11en  the ex- 
penditure ceased,  prices  fell,  before  ally  con- 
traction of currency took  place,  and that con- 
sequently the coiltraction  was  the  effect  and 
not the cause of tlic low prices.  That agricul- 
tural produce  incrcnsed  in  price  nlore  than 
inanufacturcd goods, beca~~se  machinery could 
not be brought  in  aid,  and because we  were 
compelled  to have  rc3course to inferior  lands, 
and to importation, with high freights and high 
war  charges.  That  tlie  full  employment  of 
the working class augments greatly the demand 
for coarse goods,  ancl  for corn ;  and that the 
least  excess of delnancl  for corn  beyond  what 
the home growth  could supply  would  of  ne- 
cessity  raise  its price  above  the limit of  80s. 
That when  the demand  ceased,  and  the  la- bouring  classes  had  no  longer  full  employ- 
ment,  the same quantity of,  produce became  a 
glut, whilst  the artificia-l state induced by  our 
corn laws precluded all ~elief  from exportation. 
That the foreign corn growers felt the influence 
of our demand,  at the same time that the war 
expenditure of other governments contributed 
to the same  results,  and that consequently the 
distresses of the agriculturists have been nearly 
universal.  Such a change could  scarcely have 
occurred  from  abundant  harvests  in  distant 
countries,  and  under  different  climates,  and 
still less  from  alteration  in the value of their 
currencies;  for  the fall  in  prices was felt in 
countries  where  there  had  constantly  been  a 
metallic circulation ;  and in  commodities,  the 
supply of which did not depend  upon harvests 
or seasons. 
That  the  f'oreign  expenditure  contributed 
equally with the internal expenditure in giving 
full  employment  to the artisans,  inasmuch as 
there is no mode of providing for a foreign ex- 
penditure  of such extent ant1 continuance but 
by  the  export  of  some  valuable  commodity. 
That  although  under  ordinary  circumstances 
goods can only be exported when higher prices 
abroad afford  a  profit to the merchant, the ex- 
port may  be  considerably  enlarged under  the 
operation  of  an  adverse  exchange,  since  the 
merchant  obtains  an advantage from  the pre- 
mium on foreign bills, in the same degree that 
the  exchange is  depressed.  That when  the 
currency consists of paper not convertible into 
bullion,  and the export of goods is insufficient 
to keep pace with the foreign expenditure, the 
high  premium  on  foreign  bills  advances  the 
price of  bullion,  without interfering  with  the 
prices  of  other  commodities.  That if there 
had been no restriction on specie payments, the 
contraction of currency induced by the adverse 
exchange would have raised its value above the 
natural level,  and created  s fluctuation  in fa- 
vour of all creditors, to wnich they were justly 
entitled,  and of which  they were deprived by 
the Bank Restriction Act.  That all contracts 
for purchases and sales were regulated by prices 
estimated in  currency,  and not  in  gold;  and 
that  to invalidate  those  contracts,  under the 
pretence that currency had fallen rather than 
that gold had  risen, would be to commit  a se- 
cond wrong instead of redressing the first.  That 
if an inconvertible currency could have  been so 
regulated  as  neither  to be  in  excess  nor de- 
ficiency, but to be a perfect measure of the rise 
and fall in the value of commodities, the inter- 
nal  and  foreign  expenditure  of  government 
would,  with  such  a  currency,  have  induced 
higher  prices  both  of  commodities  and gold. That,  consequently,  these  symptoms  arc  not 
necessarily  proofs  of an alteration in the value 
of currency.  That as far as we can judge from 
facts, the symptoms cannot be traced to excess 
of  circulating  medium,  but  are  in~inediately 
connected both in time and circu~nstance  wit11 
the increased expenditure of government ;  ancl 
we are warranted  in concluding, that tile  ex- 
penditure and consumption  occasioned by tl~e 
war have been the chief causes of the incrcxsed 
production during its  continoance, ancl of thc 
distress that has prevailed since its termination. 
It  has not fallen within the limits of my in- 
quiry to examine how far it is ultimately bene- 
ficial  to the country,  that  tlie  capital  sl~ould 
gradually increase  by  saving,  rather  than be 
preventedfroin accumulating by theexpenditure 
of government.  This is more a question for the 
legislator  than  the  political  economist.  My 
object has been confined to tracing its effect 011 
prices.  If  the view wl~icll  I have taken slioultl 
lead  to the inference,  that  war  is  not  itnmc- 
diately  attended  with  the  calamitous  effects 
usually ascribed to it, I beg to warn my reader, 
that whatever encourageinent the espcnditure 
of government gives to production, no perma- 
nent  benefit  arises  to  the  country if the  in- 
creased  production  is all destroyed by  a  cor- 
responding consumption.  Notwithstanding the 
excitement  occasioned  by  a  sudden  and im- 
mense demand, there will  still  remain the per- 
petual burthen of increased  taxation  as a clog 
upon all future exertion,  and for  which I fear 
no remedy will be found available. 
I am well  aware of the errors into which a 
theorist lnay be led by attempting to generalise 
too far,  and by referring  moral  effects,  as he 
would physical, to unmixed causes ;  neither do 
I wish  to exclude  the influence  of  collateral 
causes,  if  they  should  be  thought  necessary. 
The one pointed  out seems  adequately to ac- 
count for  many  of  the difficulties  that have 
presented themselves.  It cannot be denied that 
the  expenditure  has  taken  place:  that  the 
symptoms may have  arisen  from  this source is 
matter of demonstration.  The reader must de- 
cide whether  that which  is  proved  to  be  the 
possible, is not also tlie probable, nay, tlie actual 
cause of the phanomel~a  to be explained, 
THE  END. 